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 1. INTRODUCTION 
The Norwegian journalist Tomm Kristiansen met a woman in Ethiopia just after the 
national election in May 2005. The woman had voted for the party in government, the 
EPRDF (The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front). She did not 
endorse their policy and governing, so he asked her why she voted for them and not 
for the opposition. She looked at him frowning, asking who would want to vote for a 
party without power. EPRDF was the only party with power in Ethiopia; therefore it 
was the only one able to change anything.  
 
In a democracy people need to believe that the party they vote for is able to make a 
change. For people to have an incentive to vote for the opposition, it must be a viable 
alternative to governmental power. Common characteristics of young post-colonial 
democracies are a fragmented and poorly institutionalized opposition and a very strong 
ruling party. How does a structure like this affect the legitimacy of a government? 
 
In 1994 South Africa was liberated from the authoritarian regime of apartheid. The 
legacy of apartheid as left South Africa as one of the most unequal countries in the 
world. The first democratic election with universal suffrage gave the African National 
Congress (ANC) more than 60 percent of the votes. In the two subsequent national 
elections, the support for the ANC has increased to be 70 percent in 2004. Half of the 
population is still below the UN national poverty line. The opposition in South Africa 
consists of many but small parties, and is not threatening the governmental power of 
the ANC. Do South Africans, like the Ethiopian woman, vote for the ANC because 
they are in power? Or do they vote for them because they brought freedom to South 
Africa? How do these factors influence the legitimacy of the ANC government and 
what is the basis and motivation for their legitimacy? 
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 1.1 Democratic consolidation and legitimacy 
In South Africa, like in several other Sub Saharan African countries, there has been a 
transition to democracy after authoritarian and colonial rule. Some countries, like 
South Africa’s neighbor Zimbabwe, have experienced a period of democracy only to 
return to authoritarianism. Preventing this from happening in South Africa is a 
question of consolidation of democracy. Some consider consolidation of democracy to 
be proportional with the duration of democracy. A breakdown of a democratic regime 
should thereby be less likely the longer it has existed. With data from the 
Afrobarometer survey, Bratton et al show that this is not the case. They argue that 
democratic consolidation is a question of institutionalization and legitimation of 
democracy (Bratton et al 2005: 27). This view integrates the micro and macro levels 
through adopting both an institutional and a cultural approach to democratic 
consolidation. The institutional approach concentrates on the development of the 
macropolitical institutions. The starting point for institutionalists is rules and their 
legality, for instance through elections and the separation of powers. The other main 
approach to democracy is the cultural, which begins at a micro level. The cultural 
approach looks to the people, it focuses on personal attitudes and values (Ibid: 26). 
From here most culturalists focus on mass orientations and electoral behavior. The 
reasoning is that a democracy needs people who use the democratic channels, and even 
defend democracy if necessary. 
 
Researchers of democracy like Robert A. Dahl and Samuel P. Huntington have 
focused on democratic structures like elections and rights. Dahl’s minimalist definition 
of democracy of competition and participation signifies a universal right to vote and 
requires parties to represent people’s interest. The culturalists concentrate on mass 
orientations through electoral behavior and people’s expectations to and trust in their 
governments and institutions. With Bratton et al I argue that when looking at 
democratic consolidation in South Africa there is a need for both an institutional and a 
cultural approach. Democracy in South Africa can not develop without democratic 
institutions like free and fair elections and parties to represent the interests of the 
electorate. Nor can it develop without the electorate believing in the legitimacy of the 
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 institutions. This thesis concentrates on the legitimacy of the ANC government in 
South Africa. I will focus on people’s attitudes and electoral behavior, and I will 
discuss the political parties and social movements as institutions where people can 
express their beliefs and attitudes. 
 
South Africa’s past of apartheid makes the integration of an institutional and a cultural 
approach especially relevant. Racial segregation was forced upon the institutions and 
the culture of the country for several decades. The apartheid regime did have 
democratic institutions like an elected parliament, political parties and political rights. 
But they were limited to only include the white population. South Africa also had an 
independent judiciary, but the law applied to people according to race. Democratic 
institutions existed, but not the democratic concept of universalism and equality. On a 
cultural level, the idea of separate development and denying the non-white population 
a possibility to participate in governing has left a majority of the South African 
population without democratic experience. This may affect their attitudes to 
democratic participation and electing a government. How does this institutional and 
cultural legacy influence electoral behavior and mobilization today? 
 
The apartheid regime denied a majority of the population access to most of the 
resources in the country. This has left South Africa with great socioeconomical 
inequality. Poor South Africans expected things to change with the introduction of 
democracy in 1994. They expected to get a salary and to be part of what they hoped to 
be the new, prosperous South Africa. But the socioeconomic situation has not changed 
much yet. Still, 70 percent of the South African population vote for the ANC and even 
more among the black population which embodies a majority of the poor. The question 
is if a democratic government can claim to be legitimate when the inequality is this 
severe. Will South Africans continue to vote for the ANC if this does not improve?  
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 1.2 Focus and definitions 
Research Question 
My focus in this thesis is the legitimacy of the ANC government in South Africa. 
Legitimacy stems from the beliefs of the people, but must have institutions to be 
expressed. In South Africa this happens through the political parties and other political 
institutions like social movements. I will look at the legitimacy of the ANC 
government, and I will look at the sources of this legitimacy. In a democracy one 
obvious source of legitimacy is getting votes from the people in a competitive election. 
The ANC gets strong support in elections, but winning an election is not sufficient to 
be legitimate. 50 percent of the South African population is defined to be below the 
poverty line by the UNDP (UNDP 2003: 70). This situation is not changing, but 
people continue to vote for the ANC. Does this imply that people vote for the ANC for 
another reason than the outcome of its policy? Is there some other kind of authority 
backing the ANC up and giving them legitimacy in the eyes of the people? 
 
People need institutions to be able to express their attitudes and beliefs in a 
democracy. They need a choice of alternative governments. Is there any relevant 
alternative to the ANC in government in South Africa? Is there real competition for 
power? And if there is not, how does this affect the legitimacy of the government? 
 
My overall research question is 
 “To which extent is the ANC government in South Africa legitimate 
today? What are the sources of this legitimacy?” 
Definitions 
Legitimacy is a vague term in political science. For a government to have authority in 
a democracy, it must be “legitimate”. I define the “legitimacy of the ANC 
government” as the “legitimate authority of the ANC government”. A legitimate 
government has got the authority to rule over the people. A government that is ruling a 
country does have authority, but it may be legitimate or not. Robert Mugabe’s 
government in Zimbabwe has got authority, but it is not considered to be legitimate. 
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 Legitimacy is linked to trust; people trust an institution to make decisions if it is 
legitimate (Østerud et al 1997: 138). Max Weber defines an institution as legitimate as 
long as people believe it to be legitimate (Beetham 1991: 6). David Beetham defines 
power as legitimate where it is “acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, 
and with evidence of consent” (Beetham 1991: 3). In this are both a macro (rules) and 
a micro (people’s consent) perspective. Beetham extracts three dimensions of 
legitimacy which I will use in my discussion of the term: legitimacy must build on 
established rules, the people must express their consent with the government and the 
rule must build on some sort of shared beliefs. With this Beetham adds an institutional 
aspect to the question of legitimacy. Legitimacy is not only about people’s belief in it; 
it also needs the institutions for the people to express the beliefs. I will discuss this 
more thoroughly in chapter 3 “Theory”.  
 
Democracy has got many different definitions. My starting point is the minimalist 
definition by Robert A. Dahl: democracy requires participation and contestation; i.e. 
democracy requires participation from a majority of the citizens, and it requires parties 
competing for power (Dahl 1971: 1). Huntington defines democracy as consolidated 
when a post-transition government has lost elections twice, and given up power 
peacefully (Huntington 1991: 266-267). This definition of democratic consolidation is 
very strict, it leaves out many countries which are usually regarded as democratic, for 
instance Japan and South Africa. Still, it is relevant in the case of South Africa as it 
opens a discussion on peaceful turnover of power. The question is how much the 
ANC, and Thabo Mbeki as President will do to stay in power, when eventually it is 
threatened by the opposition. With Bratton et al I argue that democratic consolidation 
in South Africa is a question of democratic institutions and legitimacy. It is a question 
of the degree of democratic consolidation more than of being democratic or not.  
 
Some country-specific terms should be explained. When discussing South Africa it is 
inevitable to use the former classification of races. During apartheid people were 
defined as belonging to one of four main categories: Black (or African), Colored, 
Asian and White. During apartheid the races were segregated in all aspects of life, 
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 where they could be, which school they could go to, which beach they could be at, 
who they could have an intimate relationship with and which bench they could use1. 
Segregation was gradually abolished until the fall of apartheid in the beginning of the 
nineties. But the legacy of the segregation is still seen today. Many areas are still 
almost exclusively inhabited by one racial group and almost all the poor people of 
South Africa are black while white people have higher wages than others, have better 
housing and are better educated. Since the socioeconomic differences between the 
races are so evident, race is a variable to consider when analyzing South African 
politics. The terms Black, Colored, Asian and White are still frequently used in all 
sectors of society and culture in South Africa, and I will also use them in this paper. 
 
I use the term “the struggle” for the fight for democratic rights in South Africa. The 
time period I refer to is about three decades, from the beginning of the sixties to the 
beginning of the nineties. People were fighting against apartheid before that too, but 
the struggle was intensified after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, see chapter 2.  
 
The terms “dominant” and “subordinate” are being used in discussions of authority 
and loyalty. By the “dominant” I mean the state and its administration. In Weber’s 
classification of authority he describes authority related to three levels: authority 
between a ruler, an administration and the subordinates (Hagtvet 1978: 249). In the 
South African democratic form of dominance I include the three state powers as part 
of the dominant: the parliament (legislative), the government (executive) and the 
courts (judicial).  
 
I also speak of the “elites”. By this I mean both the political and the economic groups 
with power in the South African society. In addition to the dominant groups this 
includes business leaders and leaders of other organizations with power in society like 
the church and non-governmental organizations. 
                                                 
1 The most important segregation laws were the Population Registration Act which classified the races, the Separate 
Amenities Act which regulated the different races’ access to facilities and the Group Areas Act which regulated where the 
different races could reside. 
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 1.3 Methodology 
This is a case study with the unit “legitimacy of the ANC Government”. I use several 
theories to look at the extent and the source of the legitimacy; they are explained in 





My sources for the study are literature and field work in Cape Town conducted in 
March – April 2005. I got literature from the library at the University of Oslo (UiO), 
and connected libraries such as the one at Christian Michelsens Institute in Bergen. I 
also use analyses of the Afrobarometer survey, conducted from 1999 to 2001 in 12 
Sub Saharan African countries. I mainly use Public Opinion, Democracy and Market 
Reform in Africa (Bratton et al 2005) and Afrobarometer working papers 
(Afrobarometer 2005 [homepage]).  
 
I use information from several homepages mostly of South African organizations, 
government bodies and papers. The ones I use the most are the homepage of ANC, 
The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which is a government appointed 
commission to monitor and manage the elections, the weekly paper Mail and Guardian 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for information on 
economic development in South Africa. I also use homepages of opposition parties, 
social movements, South African and other Newspapers and of government 
institutions. 
 
I interviewed seven key-persons and ten people living in the township Khayelitsha 
outside Cape Town. To answer my research question I needed a political analysis of 
the South African society. I also needed to speak to people to get an impression of 
their opinion of the government. For the key-person interviews I contacted the partners 
of the ruling Tripartite Alliance and the main opposition party, as well as two persons 
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 who could give me a general analysis of South African politics. For the interviews 
with “regular people” I wanted a focus group which could tell me something about 
loyalty to the ANC and about satisfaction with the government. To be able to limit the 
number of interviews according to my resources, I chose to interview people who in 
my view had least reason to be satisfied with the government. The starting point for 
the thesis is about government delivery. The hypothesis is that the government will 
lose legitimacy at some point because it is not doing enough about the social 
inequalities in South Africa, and about the widespread poverty in the country. Poor 
people live in the rural areas and in the townships surrounding almost all cities in 
South Africa. Because of the apartheid system, Blacks are in general poorer than 
others, and because of forced removals Blacks in townships outside cities were placed 
together in economic unfavorable environments. I chose to do my interviews in one 
such township: Khayelitsha outside Cape Town.  
 
By using different sources like literature, Afrobarometer surveys, articles, interviews, 
newspapers and homepages I hope to get a nuanced and updated picture of the 
situation in South Africa. The different sources must be interpreted in a context, but 
they do supplement each other in drawing a more detailed picture of the legitimacy of 
the ANC government than I would have got by not using them all.  
1.4 Operationalization, Validity and Generalization 
Are the operationalization of the research question and the sources I use appropriate 
for answering the question? I explain how I have operationalized the terms I use, and I 
discuss some sources of information.  
 
My dependent variable is “the legitimacy of the ANC government”. As mentioned, 
legitimacy is a vague term, and is therefore difficult to measure. I chose to use David 
Beetham’s three dimensions of legitimacy because I thereby got to explore the sides of 
legitimacy which I find most relevant for South Africa. To discuss the sources of 
legitimacy I discuss Weber’s ideal types of authority, namely legal-rational, traditional 
and charismatic, of which the emphasis is on the last one. 
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I extract two important independent variables in the analysis of legitimacy: delivery of 
the government and political space (See chapter 4). With Juan Linz (see chapter 3) I 
define government delivery as efficacy and effectiveness. From this I look at ANC’s 
economic policy and how it is received by people and on the outcome of the policy 
and the socioeconomic situation of the country. Political space is measured by 
mobilization of the South African electorate. The share the parties mobilize I measure 
as the share of votes they get in the national election. I also include mobilization 
through social movements. For this mobilization I look at the attention they get in 
newspapers, and how many members they have.  
 
The variables I discuss in the analysis all have many possible meanings. I have had to 
make a choice as to what I wanted to include. I have used several theories, explained 
in chapter 3, to extract the most relevant variables for an analysis of the legitimacy of 
the ANC government. It is not a quantitative approach of exact numbers; it is a 
qualitative approach with an intension of including the relevant discussions.  
 
I did ten interviews in Khayelitsha. I do not claim that they are representative for 
South Africans in general. I chose to do interviews in Khayelitsha because one could 
expect people here to be dissatisfied with the government, and therefore that they 
would be loosing faith in the ANC. The universe is chosen because of its ability to 
strengthen a theory. This is what Yin calls analytical generalization (Yin 2003: 37). 
This is the same method of testing a theory as would be done in an experiment by a 
scientist in a laboratory. She would not try to get a statistical representative result, but 
rather do an experiment under special conditions which would support a theory or not. 
I chose the special conditions to see if my hypotheses could be strengthened or not. I 
regard it to be a social anthropologic methodological approach within a case study of 
political science. I have talked to some people to find out what their position is on 
some variables, but their answers cannot be generalized outside this universe. 
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 I have used articles from newspapers in my research. It may be somewhat coincidental 
what issues are dealt with in the papers. But newspapers are important as channels for 
political debate. If COSATU strikes, it has larger impact if it is noticed in the papers 
than if it is not. I use papers as a source for locating the political hot spots.  
1.5 Khayelitsha interviews 
Khayelitsha as a township was established in the early 80’s. It is situated about 35 
kilometers outside Cape Town. The number of people assumed to live there varies; 
some say it is as many as one million people, but according to the online newsletter 
“Come 2 Cape Town” there are about 400 000 inhabitants in Khayelitsha (Come 2 
Cape Town 2005 [homepage]). The township is becoming a significant tourist 
destination. Tourists want to see the “other side” of South Africa, and the special 
culture in townships is a great way of seeing something else. Khayelitsha is the fastest 
growing township in South Africa. There are many shacks because of widespread 
poverty, and there are many government supported houses. Poor people can get 
government support for materials to build a house. Khayelitsha is developing. The 
shacks are getting fewer, and more employment is moving into the townships with 
business and services settling there. Both government and NGO programs are 
supporting development in the township (Ibid.). 
 
I chose the township because of the many poor people living there. I had to use a 
guide; it is still not recommended for a white person to walk around on her own as a 
stranger in the township. I got in touch with a girl who lives in a community in 
Khayelitsha called Harare. This is traditionally a community with many shacks, but 
mostly thanks to government support there are more and more houses. Still it is a poor 
community. I did 10 interviews in Harare in two days, and I spoke to some 
organizations operating in the area.  
The interviews 
I used an interview guide for my interviews (Appendix 1). The interviews lasted from 
15 minutes up to one hour. Some of the interviewees were very talkative, and 
answered several questions at the time while others were hard to get to talk and I had 
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 to specify the questions, and even use examples they could chose from for them to 
answer.  
 
The aim of these interviews was to find out about the interviewees’ political 
participation, their thoughts on the government and its delivery and also how loyal 
they were to the ANC. The questions were about the interviewees’ political actions, 
especially on participation and their opinion on government efficacy. I asked them 
what they voted for and why, and if they were politically active in any other way. I 
also asked them about government effectiveness and about the ANC and what they 
thought about the party and how they felt about politicians.  
 
The communication at the interviews in Khayelitsha was sometimes difficult. English 
is much spoken, but it is not the first language of people living in Khayelitsha2. People 
who were engaged in community work and people employed in the formal sector 
understood easily what I was talking about. But at least two women did not seem to 
understand the entire interview (Khayelitsha 2005, no 4 and 5 [interviews]). They both 
said at some point of the interview, when I tried to ask them about their opinion on the 
government, that they didn’t have the language to express what they were thinking. In 
interview no 5 my guide was with me, and translated some of it, but it seemed like the 
interviewee was not in the line of thinking of my questions. For those two interviews 
the question: “What do you think of the government?” didn’t seem to make sense. The 
government is governing, and they are doing what they can. They wouldn’t analyze 
the way the government is working.  
 
There were great variations among the interviewees as to how much I got out of the 
interview. There were differences among the interviewees as to whether they were 
employed in the formal (Interviewee no 1, 6, 8 and 10) or informal sector3 
(Interviewee no 3, 4 and 5) or were unemployed (Interviewee no 2, 7 and no 9 who 
was in school), and to whether they engaged in community work (Interviewee no 1, 2, 
3, 6, 7 and 8) and not (Interviewee no 4, 5, 9 and 10). Interviewee no 4 and 5 were 
                                                 
2 Their first language is Xhosa; most of them have English as second language.  
3 For definition of informal sector see footnote 6 in chapter 2.3. 
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 both employed in the informal sector (one selling fish from her house, and the other 
cleaning houses, but not full time), and they were not engaging in community work. In 
addition to possible language problems, this complicated the communication at the 
interviews. They were clearly not used to the analytical way of thinking as the 
interviews required. The people engaging in community work, or who were employed 
in the formal sector (all working with community related issues) were all much more 
aware of problems in their community, and more analytical in how they were thinking 
about them.  
 
The interviewees were from 20 to about 50 years old. There were eight women and 
two men. One lived in a shack while the rest lived in government supported houses. 
All ten said they had little money, but most of them said they managed, either because 
they did not spend much, or by working extra shifts.  
1.6 Key-person interviews 
I did seven key-person interviews. ANC is governing South Africa in alliance with the 
congress of labor unions and the Communist party. I interviewed the three partners of 
this Tripartite Alliance: Ben Sizane, employed at ANC’s Regional Office in Cape 
Town, Khaya Magaxa, Provincial Secretary of the Western Cape in the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and Tony Ehrenreich, Regional Secretary in The Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). I interviewed two Parliamentarians from 
the Democratic Alliance (DA), the main opposition party; Ryan Coetzee 
(spokesperson on health) and Helen Zille (spokesperson on education). I also 
interviewed Jonathan Faull at The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) 
and Berry Streek, former journalist and political analyst, now editor in Chief at 
Jonathan Ball Publishers. My purpose with these interviewees was to get an overview 
of the political situation in South Africa, and an evaluation of the political space, the 
opposition and the delivery and authority of the ANC government. 
Interviews 
I used an interview guide for the interviews (Appendix 2). Carrying out these 
interviews was a lot easier than the Khayelitsha interviews. The key-persons were 
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 chosen because of their knowledge or their political work, and were all very engaged 
in talking about it. The interviews lasted from half an hour (Ryan Coetzee from the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) had very little time) to about an hour and a half. Because of 
the DA interview being short, I did another interview with Helen Zille from the DA. 
This I did by e-mail.  
 
When interviewing one person in an organization, one might not get the official view 
of the organization. For the political parties, they are careful not to say anything that 
would conflict with the party view, so their answers are likely to be in line with the 
official policy.  
1.7 Outline for the thesis   
Chapters two and three constitute the background, empirical and theoretical, for the 
thesis. In chapter two I emphasize the history and the legacy of apartheid in South 
Africa. I also focus on the socioeconomic situation of the country today. Chapter four 
contains the rationale for the discussion and the analysis in the remaining chapters. I 
explain the hypotheses I extract from chapters two and three and the focus for the rest 
of the thesis. In this chapter I define which parts of the theory are relevant for the 
research question and which parts are not.  
 
Chapters five, six and seven constitute the analysis of the thesis. In chapter five I 
discuss the delivery and authority of the ANC government, and in chapter six I discuss 
the political space in South Africa, electoral behavior and the potential for 
mobilization. I also look at the strong ANC and the weak opposition. In chapter seven 
I conclude the discussion about the legitimacy of the ANC government. I pick up the 
discussions from chapters five and six, and see them within the framework of 
Beetham’s dimensions of legitimacy. 
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 2. THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA AND THE LEGACY FROM THE PAST 
To understand the strong support for the ANC in South Africa today one must be 
aware of the history of the country. History is part of the explanation of which are the 
leading political actors today, and the past is also the reason for the major problems 
and challenges the country is facing. In this chapter I will in brief describe the rise and 
fall of the apartheid regime and the transition to democracy. I will also describe the 
main actors in South African politics.  
2.1 The Struggle 
In 1910 various political groups of Afrikaners, British and independent tribes united in 
the Union of South Africa (Terreblanche 2002: 239). Industrialization of the country 
led to a need for cheap labor in industry and agriculture.  Both the British and the 
Afrikaners exploited Africans by forcing them into underpaid labor. This cheap, black 
labor was the reason for the Union being able to export gold at a high profit. 
Modernization thus consolidated white supremacy and racial capitalism (Ibid). During 
this period the British adopted segregation of the races as the country’s native policy 
(Ibid: 241).  
 
The South African Native National Congress (Later the African National Congress, 
ANC), was founded in 1912, only two years after the South African Union. It worked 
for democratic rights and non-discrimination for all South Africans. Already at this 
point it was obvious that Africans interests were second to white interests.  
 
The National Party (NP) was established in 1914, mobilizing poor Whites, mostly 
Afrikaners. They introduced the idea of “apartheid”4 during the election campaign in 
1948. The policy was not so different from the British segregation policy. But it was 
more explicit in the discrimination of Africans, they introduced “separate 
                                                 
4 “Apartheid” is Afrikaans for separateness (Østerud et al 1997: 14).  
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 development” and Africans were not only to be treated apart from whites, they were to 
be treated as “subordinate” human beings.  
 
The ANC worked to prevent this development, where Africans’ rights were more and 
more limited.  Until the 1940’s they were careful not to act in any way that could be 
considered illegal (Terreblanche 2002: 281). They tried to influence the government 
with arguments and through debating, but they were not heard. From the 40’s the 
organization was radicalized, most importantly through the creation of ANC Youth 
League (ANCYL) in 1944, where Nelson Mandela was one of the founders (ANC 
2005 [homepage]). In 1949 they adopted the first common strategy against white 
domination (Terreblanche 2002: 283). The strategy was called “Program of Action” 
and opened for the use of boycotts, strikes and non-cooperation (ANC 2005 
[homepage]). 
 
From the 50’s and onwards, the ANC had frequent demonstrations against different 
regulations from the Government. During a demonstration in Sharpeville in 1960 
against the pass laws, the main law used for influx control, the police shot down and 
killed 69 people. This led to massive protests against the Government, which answered 
by banning both ANC and PAC and arresting thousands of people (Terreblanche 2002: 
306). After this the ANC turned to violent resistance, and set up a military wing: 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), “Spear of the Nation”. 
 
At the same time, the government started arresting people in a large scale. After a raid 
at Rivonia Farm in 1963, the government arrested most of the ANC leadership. Nelson 
Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki and others were sentenced to life imprisonment 
in June 1964 (ANC 2005 [homepage]). The majority of the ANC leadership was 
imprisoned at Robben Island, which became a leading ANC branch during the 
seventies and eighties.  
 
After the Rivonia trial, most of the ANC leadership was either in prison or in exile. 
This made the umbrella organization United Democratic Front (UDF) the main actor 
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 in the fight against the apartheid regime. Because of the brutal and thorough 
government action against the resistance movements during the 60’s, the movement 
was largely inactive for a whole decade (Terreblanche 2002: 349). A turning point in 
the struggle came with the Soweto uprising 16th in June 1976 when the youth of 
Soweto demonstrated in the streets against the use of Afrikaans in school. The youth 
showed that they were still willing to fight. This started mass protests, both inside and 
outside South Africa, which lasted until the fall of the apartheid regime in the 
beginning of the nineties. The ANC had a marginal role in the Soweto uprising 
(Terreblanche 2002: 352). But the ANC exiles were important for gathering support 
internationally for a democratic South Africa.  
 
The fall of the apartheid regime was thanks to many organizations; it was because of 
joint forces that it was possible to measure up to the strong enemy, the apartheid 
Government. When the fight was over, the ANC successfully claimed it to be their 
victory (Ehrenreich 2005 [interview]). Mandela was the icon, the personification of the 
long fight, and the liberation. He was the obvious leader of the new, democratic 
government, and ANC was the obvious party to vote for to most of the former 
suppressed population. In the first national election in 1994 ANC got more than 60 
percent of the votes (IEC 2005 [homepage]). 
2.2 The Transition 
The transition to democracy in the beginning of the 90’s was negotiated by the ANC 
and the apartheid Government. The apartheid government was pushed by the 
international community as well as by more and more people in South Africa. They 
demanded democratic elections; open to all the peoples of South Africa. During the 
negotiations the ANC also had to give up on some of its demands, among other things 
a power sharing the first years of democracy and a conditional amnesty for 
perpetrators. 
 
The first government of the democratic South Africa was an arrangement called the 
Government of National Unity (GNU). GNU consisted of people from the ANC and 
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 the NP, as well as from the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP). Most of the violence which 
took place during the transition happened between the ANC and the IFP, so the IFP 
was an important participant in the negotiations, and later in GNU. GNU split up in 
1996, two years before intended, when the NP broke out of it.  
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), lead by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
was an important arrangement to help South Africans move on after the fall of the 
apartheid regime. It operated from 1996 to 1998 and received more than 20 000 
submissions from victims and nearly 8 000 applications for amnesty from perpetrators 
(Freedom House 2004 [homepage]). It dealt with atrocities committed not only by the 
apartheid government, but by all actors in the struggle, also the ANC and the IFP. The 
most important feature of the TRC was that it gave South Africans a shared 
understanding of the violations committed during apartheid, and that it created 
openness about the past. It identified perpetrators and it recognized victims. It was 
recognized that atrocities were committed, which was important to be able to move on 
for the victims. The TRC discredited the apartheid system in the eyes of almost all 
South Africans. No-one could openly support apartheid after the open witness 
hearings. 
2.3 Socioeconomic situation and legacy from apartheid 
South Africa’s history of apartheid has left the country in a state of great inequality. A 
minority of the people was given control over almost all the resources in the country, 
while the majority was denied access to almost everything. Having had a negotiated 
transition, the economic policy of the ANC government has been influenced by the 
economic elites from the old regime. To get a reform in the business, the government 
had to consider their interests in their economic policy. Stephen Gelb from the 
University of Witwatersrand calls it an “implicit bargain” between the ANC and the 
mainly white business of South Africa: ANC committed to macroeconomic stability 
and international openness, and the business reformed its ownership, opening up to the 
black middle class, and thereby changing the racial structure (Gelb 2005: 369).  
 
 20
 The greatest challenges in South Africa today are inequality and unemployment, and 
they are closely connected. Except Brazil, South Africa is the most unequal society in 
the world today. One measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient5. In 1995 Norway 
had a Gini coefficient of 0.26 (SSB 2005 [homepage]), while South Africa had a Gini 
coefficient of 0.63 in 2001, up from 0.59 in 1993-94 (UNDP 2005 [homepage]). This 
is still believed to be increasing. Since democracy was introduced in South Africa the 
difference between the rich and the poor has increased. The economy has improved, 
but it has not gained the poor. Wealth, i.e. assets, is even more unequal distributed than 
income. Wealth does not only bring material assets to a household, but also security 
and power (UNDP 2003: 72). A poor household is very vulnerable to changes or 
disturbances in their normal income, for instance caused by illness. This may cause 
severe problems in getting food on the table, while a household with some 
accumulated savings is more able to shake off such temporarily income decreases. The 
elites in a society are also more participating in politics and decision-making in 
society, they have more influence both on the agenda discussed, and on the decisions 
made (Varshney 1999). Thus the interests of the poor are often not as visible in a 
democracy as other interests.  
 
Unemployment constitutes a major problem in South Africa today. Following Fafo’s 
labor force survey for South Africa, Mesebetsi, conducted in 1999/2000, the 
unemployment rate is 32 percent or 45 percent depending on the definition of 
unemployment (Tørres 2001: 8). The strict definition is people who are without work, 
who are available and actively looking for work. This is 32 percent of the South 
African work force. The expanded definition does not require that people are actively 
looking for work, which makes out an unemployment rate of 45 percent in South 
Africa. Probably a share of the people who are not looking for work in South Africa 
has given up because there are few jobs to look for. This makes the unemployment rate 
likely to be higher than it is with the strict definition. 
 
                                                 
5 The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 for perfect equality and 1 for perfect inequality. 
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 About 60 percent of the working population is employed in the formal sector (Tørres 
2001: 16). About 20 percent of the working population is employed in agriculture and 
domestic work, and 20 percent is in the informal sector6. The informal sector does not 
follow government regulations such as tax and security regulations, as well as health 
and security rules for the employed. The informal sector has increased the last decade; 
in 2002 about two-thirds (63 percent) of the working population was in non-
agricultural formal employment, while the number was 70 percent in 1995 (UNDP 
2003: 147). 
 
One of the major problems related to unemployment in South Africa, and partly 
causing it, is lack of skills, especially among Africans (UNDP 2003 chapter 7). This is 
caused by the inferior education that Africans got only a couple of decades ago. The 
apartheid state reformed slightly during the 70’s and 80’s, to get more accept, but still 
maintain the white power. In 1995 a whole 67 percent of the African population had 
no education at all or only primary school, whereas the number for whites was 22 
percent (Tørres 2000: 499). The development the last decade has been an increasing 
number of skilled jobs, while the number of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs has been 
decreasing (Tørres 2001: 24). Africans are increasingly employed in almost all 
occupational categories in the South African UNDP report, except for “professionals” 
and “skilled agricultural and fishery workers” (UNDP 2003: 144). The development in 
the job market affects the unskilled workers most, and here the African population is 
overrepresented.  
 
Another legacy from apartheid, keeping up the structures of inequality in South Africa 
is the segregated settlement pattern. The apartheid government constructed 
“homelands” for the Africans to live in as part of the segregation of the races. For 
instance the rural areas of today’s provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape 
are almost congruent with some of the former homelands. There are almost no 
Coloreds, Asians or Whites living in these areas, even today. Numbers from Statistics 
                                                 
6 The Mesebetsi survey describes the informal sector as “including employees, employers, self-employed people or family 
business workers who work for private sector enterprises with 20 or less employees and in enterprises that are not registered 
or incorporated and do not keep a set of accounts separate from the household budget (Tørres 2001, note 5 p 70). 
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 South Africa (StatsSA) from 2003 show that a lot more people in the former 
homelands are not economically active compared to other areas of the country (51 
percent compared to 33 percent for women and 43 percent compared to 26 percent for 
men), and that the percentage employed in the formal sector is about half of what it is 
for the areas which were not homelands (7 percent compared to 18 percent for women 
and 18 percent to 36 percent for men) (People’s Budget 2005:5). 
 
Because of the need for cheap labor in the cities people were moved from the 
homelands to the townships outside the cities. These still represent one of the main 
structures for inequality. The Group Areas Act determined where the population 
groups could reside. Most blacks were concentrated in rural areas and in townships. 
This pattern of living is very much the same for South Africa today. Some of the better 
off in the townships have moved away, but the poor cannot afford to live anywhere 
else. This cements the socioeconomic structures. In the townships the unemployment 
rate is very high and a high percentage of the population is HIV infected or sick with 
Aids. The townships are somewhat away from the city centers, which makes the costs 
for transport to work higher for people living there than for people living in the cities. 
My interviewee no 8 was employed in an organization working with social problems 
in Khayelitsha. He explained that this structure is strengthened also because the Black 
people living in townships are usually employed in a lower position than whites or 
people not living in townships. Therefore they are seldom the ones to get travel 
allowances (Khayelitsha 2005, no 8 [interview]). So the people in the townships are 
the ones with the highest travel expenses, but they are rarely the ones to get them 
compensated. 
 
UNDP’s recommendations as to how to increase employment among the poor 
concentrates on creating more skilled labor, and giving employees in the informal 
sector legal guarantees and social protection (UNDP 2003: 163ff). They recommend 
focus on labor intensive production, and training unskilled workers to get them into 
skilled labor. They also recommend reducing the living costs for the poor. Fewer and 
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 fewer basic services are free, and this increases the financial constraints on poor 
households (UNDP 2003: 80). 
 
COSATU has initiated a series of monthly demonstrations from 2005 to 2006 with a 
demand for the government to do more about unemployment. They demand a 
devaluation of the South African Rand, because with a strong Rand the elite is earning 
money, but it makes South Africa loose jobs because of increased expenses on export 
(SAPA June 27th 2005 [Newspaper article]). 
 
There are a lot of government programs to improve skills among the poor. For instance 
a project in the Western Cape, called the “Red Door” is encouraging and guiding 
people who want to start small businesses in the province. This was mentioned by the 
ANC as a project that should make it easier for people with good ideas to follow them, 
and to get funding (Sizane 2005 [Interview]). They do have a problem with getting the 
poor to use the programs; the effect of them will probably increase once they become 
known to more people. 
2.4 The New Actors 
The most dominant actors in South African politics today are the ones who fought 
against the apartheid regime only a little more than ten years ago.  
The liberation movement ANC 
The ANC was founded in 1912. From 1960 it was an illegal organization, but was 
recognized as a political party again by the apartheid government in 1990. When the 
ANC was unbanned in 1990, and their main goal of freedom was on its way to be 
fulfilled, they would of course have great loopholes in their political strategies. Their 
leadership had been parted through exile and prison for almost three decades, and there 
had been no possibilities for gatherings or congresses to create the policies and 
political strategies needed for a party to govern. The Freedom Charter, adopted as a 
main strategy in 1955, was still the leading policy document on many issues.  
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 The ANC as an organization was split in several “cultures” in 1990. The leaders of the 
organization were either imprisoned at Robben Island, in exile or activists staying in 
South Africa during the struggle, of which many had been active in the UDF. These 
groupings all practiced different organizational cultures. The prisoners on Robben 
Island had a culture of discussing all policy matters thoroughly, and then reaching a 
conclusion which was considered to be the best for all. The exiles were used to strict 
military discipline and not sharing all information, because of fear of spies from the 
apartheid government. The internal activists, organized through UDF, practiced more 
of a democratic culture with open debate and participation from all members (Gumede 
2005: 292). The different cultures were competing in the ANC after the unbanning. 
With Thabo Mbeki as ANC president, the closed culture of the exiles is considered to 
be strong (Ibid: 293). Tony Ehrenreich of COSATU describes ANC today as a 
somewhat authoritarian organization (Ehrenreich 2005 [interview]). 
 
Barry Streek describes the ANC as covering too much of the political spectrum to be a 
traditional political party in the Western sense (Streek 2005 [interview]). ANC is a 
“broad church for all” (Sizane 2005 [interview]). It regards itself as a mass movement 
“representing the whole nation more than a party competing against others for political 
power” (Gumede 2005: 239). Its policy is to include political opponents, both persons 
and organizations, through membership or political alliances.  
The Tripartite Alliance 
Many organizations were fighting along with the ANC during the struggle: the 
communist party (SACP), several organizations and labor unions under the umbrella 
of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Pan African Congress (PAC), churches 
and others. The common struggle is the foundation for the alliances in South African 
politics today, the most important one being the Tripartite Alliance in which the ANC 
governs the country together with the SACP and COSATU. The roots of the Tripartite 
Alliance go back to the struggle and the cooperation between the organizations. It was 
formalized when the parties and organizations were unbanned in the early nineties. 
Because of the Tripartite Alliance COSATU and the SACP are collecting votes for the 
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 ANC in the elections, and in return they participate in the formulation of government 
policy. SACP does not compete in elections on its own.  
 
Both COSATU and the SACP complain that the ANC does not consider their demands 
when governing, only when an election is forthcoming. The ANC is the most powerful 
partner of the alliance, winning the elections and having the biggest institutionalized 
organization. But surveys show that the SACP would get about 15-17 percent of the 
votes if it had competed in the elections (e-Politics 2005, edition 2). This would have 
made it the biggest opposition party. COSATU has got about 1.8 million members 
(COSATU 2005 [homepage]). The ANC has got about 400 000 members (e-politics 
2005, edition 3: 3) Many of the members of COSATU would probably continue to 
vote for the ANC even if the alliance broke, but the number of members does give 
COSATU some weight in the alliance. If COSATU and the SACP would break out of 
the alliance to form an opposition to the left of the ANC together, it would be a serious 
challenge to the ANC. But all three partners ensure that for now there is no intention 
of breaking the alliance (Sizane 2005, Ehrenreich 2005, Magaxa 2005 [interviews]). 
Opposition 
One of the main opposition parties until recently, the New National Party (NNP), has 
dissolved because of declining support and suggested their supporters to vote for their 
opponent, the ANC. The NNP were the successors of the former apartheid government 
party, the National Party (NP). The former liberals, the Democratic Party and the 
Federal Alliance created the Democratic Alliance (DA) in 2002 (DA 2005 
[homepage]). This is now the biggest opposition party with 12.4 percent of the votes in 
the national election in 2004 (IEC 2005 [homepage]). 
 
Opposition to the left: 
Today there is no opposition to the left that constitute a real threat to the power of the 
ANC. There are a lot of parties to the left of the ANC, but they are small. The United 
Democratic Movement (UDM) broke out of the ANC in 1992. It got 2.3 percent of the 
votes in the 2004 election; and was the biggest opposition party to the left (IEC 2005 
[homepage]). As long as the Tripartite Alliance exists, the ANC is covering the left. 
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 The ANC has got both the communists and the labor unions mobilizing their votes. As 
long as COSATU stays a labor union, and does not split and turn into a political party, 
there is no real threat to the left. 
 
The SACP is discussing whether they should compete in elections or not. The party 
holds a national congress every fifth year, the last one was in Durban in April 2005. 
The SACP is divided on the issue of competing in elections or not, but the national 
congress decided to stay in the alliance, and continue to mobilize votes for the ANC 
(Mail and Guardian April 15th 2005). The alliance serves the party’s interests by giving 
them influence in the Government. 
Ethnic opposition: 
The majority of South Africans vote for the ANC, 70 percent of them in the 2004 
election. The percentage voting for the ANC among the Black South Africans is even 
higher. In KwaZulu-Natal, many Zulus vote for the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP). IFP 
got 35 percent of the votes in the province in the 2004 national election, while the 
ANC got 47.5 percent. The vote for the IFP has decreased since 1994. In 1994 the IFP 
got almost 50 percent of the votes in KwaZulu-Natal, while the ANC got about 30 
percent. In 1999 they both got about 40 percent of the votes, and in 2004 the ANC got 
more votes than the IFP. In the other provinces the IFP does not get many votes, on a 
national level they got 7 percent of the votes in 2004 (IEC 2005 [homepage]). 
Ethnicity and vote does not correlate perfectly. Many Zulus vote for the ANC, also in 
KwaZulu-Natal (Friedman 2004: 3).  
 
The IFP has been using nationalism and fear in their election campaigns. They have 
argued that the ANC only would look after the interests of the Xhosa people, and not 
the Zulus (Faull 2005 [interview]). This has been proven wrong since 1994. In the last 
election they have tried to turn into a more traditional western conservative party, and 
have emphasized family values and the traditional Zulu values. This change in policy 
has just contributed in confusing the electorate (Ibid.). IFP has also got a successor 
problem. Mangozuthu Buthelezi started the organization in 1975, then called “Inkhata 
National Cultural Liberation Movement”, and has been the leader of the organization 
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 since (IFP 2005 [homepage]). Now he is getting old and no one special points out as 
his successor (Faull 2005 [interview]). 
 
Ethnic opposition from Whites is the Freedom Front Plus, which got 0.9 percent of the 
votes in 2004 (IEC 2005 [homepage]). They are not a real threat to governmental 
power.  
Opposition to the right: 
The Democratic Alliance (DA) is the biggest opposition party in South Africa. They 
got 12.4 percent of the votes in 2004, up from 9.5 percent in 1999 and 1.7 percent in 
1994 (Then as the Democratic Party) (IEC 2005 [homepage]). After the 2004 election 
they got 60 seats in Parliament (Parliament 2005 [homepage]).  
 
The DA is especially strong in the Western Cape, where they got 27 percent of the 
votes in the last election (IEC 2005 [homepage]). Helen Zille, MP of the DA, explains 
this with the racial composition of the Western Cape (Zille 2005 [interview by e-
mail]), there is a minority of blacks in the province. She thinks it is a racial vote rather 
than an ideological vote. The Western Cape is the only province in South Africa where 
Blacks are not a majority. There are about 50 percent Coloreds in the Western Cape, 
and about 25 percent Whites and 25 percent Blacks. The Colored vote on a national 
level is split in three: 1/3 is voting for the ANC, 1/3 for the DA and 1/3 for other 
opposition parties (Faull 2005 [interview]). 
 
The DA is also using the fact that the white population of South Africa is used to the 
Westminster System which favors one strong opposition party (Faull 2005 
[interview]). Ryan Coetzee explains the DA’s many votes with it being a strong 
opposition party. People believe that they can oppose the ANC, even if the DA is a lot 
smaller (Coetzee 2005 [interview]). They got a big increase in support with the slogan 
“Fight Back” in the 1999 election (Faull 2005 [interview]); which refers to the two-
party system of the Westminster system. 
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 The DA is accused of using the white fear of the black majority to get votes (Faull 
2005 [interview]). The “Fight Back” campaign is also interpreted to be “fight back the 
ANC”, and get a white ruling party again. They have not managed to get votes from 
ANC supporters who are looking for something else (Ibid). 
 
The New National Party (NNP) does not exist anymore. Used to having governmental 
power during apartheid, they did not know how to be in opposition. Their electorate 
got confused by their different alliances and political strategies (Faull 2005 
[interview]). First they were part of the Government of National Unity from 1994 and 
pulled out, two years before it ended, in 1996. After the 1999 election, they were in 
position in the Western Cape, and in opposition on the national level. This was 
confusing for their constituency in their strongest province. Now the NNP has 
dissolved. This has left a hole in the party system, and this resulted in a lower turnout 
in 2004 (Ibid). 
Issue-based Opposition 
Before democracy was introduced in South Africa, all movements were affiliated with 
political parties. They were all trying to overthrow the illegitimate apartheid 
government. In today’s democracy, the social movements are independent from the 
parties. Today they are in opposition to the ANC, which is not easy considering the 
cooperation in the past (Ballard 2005: 77). Through the Tripartite Alliance many of the 
opposition leaders from COSATU and the SACP are in government. There is a need 
for new people and new movements to form an opposition, but many of the leaders of 
these movements have also been active in the struggle, and feel attached to it (Ibid: 5). 
Many opposition parties agree with the ANC on the economic policy in South Africa 
today. The main economic opposition is the DA, which wants a more liberal economic 
policy and a freer market. It is left to the social movements to form an opposition to 
the left against the liberal economic policy. This applies to Anti-eviction campaign and 
The Landless Peoples Movement, both working with the housing problem. 
 
Through the alliance with the ANC, COSATU cooperates with the ANC, and is 
possibly prevented from being as mush in opposition to them as they would have been 
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 otherwise. In this sense the alliance could reduce COSATU’s impact on governmental 
policy, because they were quieted by it. But through arranging mass demonstrations 
and strikes against government policy they have shown that they are not afraid of 
going against the ANC. They also claim to get more influence over the government 
through the Tripartite Alliance (Ehrenreich 2005 [interview]). Most of the poor in 
South Africa are not employed in the formal sector, and so the labor union is limited as 
their channel of influence. But COSATU is concerned with the inequality in South 
Africa, and it does address the rights and problems of the poor. It also cooperates with 
other organizations working for the interests of the poor. Throughout 2005 COSATU 
has frequently arranged mass demonstrations and strikes to oppose to low levels of job 
creation and the economic policy of the ANC. 
 
Ballard claims that the small size of the middle class in South Africa results in few 
organizations working for social justice (Ballard 2005: 86). In the Western Countries it 
is the middle class that makes out most of the “social justice organizations”. But 
Jonathan Faull at IDASA says that the middle class is engaging, and increasingly 
(2005 [interview]). The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)7 is a movement that 
engages the middle class. In South Africa poor people are engaging as well as the 
middle class. Organizations like the Landless People’s Movement and the Anti-
eviction campaign mobilize the poor. All organizations attract young people. 
 
                                                 
7 TAC is working for the rights of the HIV/ Aids infected people of South Africa.  
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 3. THEORY  
In this chapter I will present the theoretical background for the discussion on the 
legitimacy of the ANC government. My overall theoretical framework is David 
Beetham’s three dimensions of legitimacy (Beetham 1991). In the analysis I build the 
discussion of legitimacy upon government delivery and ANC’s source of authority. 
Here I will begin with a presentation of Juan Linz’ division of delivery into efficacy 
and effectiveness. I resume by explaining Weber’s different sources of authority. Then 
I go through Beetham’s theory of the different dimensions of legitimacy. A crucial 
point of Beetham’s dimension of “expressed consent” for South Africa is a real choice 
of government for the electorate. In a multiparty democracy with election of 
representatives to a Parliament, a real choice of government implies a competition for 
power through political parties. As instruments for analyzing party competition in 
South Africa I have chosen Juan Linz’ theory of political space, Adam Habib on 
substantive uncertainty and Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy”. 
3.1 Juan Linz: Efficacy and Effectiveness 
One of my founding hypotheses is that the ANC government does not deliver to the 
poor. A relevant specification of “delivery” is done by Juan Linz by dividing it into 
“efficacy” and “effectiveness”. He explains “efficacy” as being the policy where the 
solution to problems is described, while “effectiveness” is the actual implementation 
of policy (Linz 1978). These aspects both affect the legitimacy of a government. 
Efficacy influences legitimacy because people’s belief in the government depends on 
their view of the government being able to solve problems in a good manner. 
Effectiveness affects legitimacy because people judge how the government performs. 
Both efficacy and effectiveness represent special problems for new regimes. The 
efficacy of a regime is judged by their previous performance in a long-term 
perspective. This is a problem for new regimes, since they have no past to show to 
(Linz 1978: 21). This problem increases because there are often high expectations to a 
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 new regime, and if these are not met in their policy documents, they risk a 
considerable drop in legitimacy.  
 
The effectiveness a government is judged by its actual implementation of policy and 
its outputs (Ibid: 22). And for a new regime a special problem is that they 
underestimate the opinion of the opposition. In a new regime, which has often got a 
disorganized and fragmented opposition, the government does not see the resistance 
their policies encounter. Where the government succeeds a despised regime, out of 
self-righteousness they may also overlook the valid arguments against their policy 
from the opposition, which otherwise could have improved the quality of the outputs 
(Ibid: 23).  
3.2 Max Weber: Authority 
Max Weber defines authority as the ability to command and the duty to obey (Weber 
1971: 75). According to Weber there are three forms of justifications, or sources for 
legitimacy, for ruling. These are legal rule, traditional rule and charismatic rule (Ibid, 
chapter 4). They build on the three pure forms of authority which are the legal-rational, 
traditional and charismatic (Hagtvet 1978: 249). The legal-rational authority is based 
on law and specialization of the administration of the state. The leaders need rules to 
get legitimate authority, and the administration is selected because of their qualities. 
The pure form of legal-rational authority is the bureaucracy. In the bureaucracy the 
bureaucrats have the power to make decisions through rules and through their position 
in the hierarchy. The bureaucracy is supposed to be impartial, all citizens are equal. 
The legal-rational authority is the ideal for the structures of the authority of the modern 
state.  
 
The traditional authority gives a leader inherited power of some kind. It is typically 
patriarchal dominance. The leader's power is limited by the traditional norms of 
society. Decisions are expected to be fair, just and reasonable. It is a utilitarian form of 
legitimacy. Authoritarian rule, which claims legitimacy based on custom, is also an 
example of a claim of a rule building on traditional authority (Weber 1971: 96). This is 
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 a paternalistic kind of authority; one example is the policy of separate development of 
the apartheid regime in South Africa where white people were dominant and claimed 
to be superior to other races. They claimed to fit the development to the different 
races, each race developing in the area they needed to.  
 
The third pure form of authority is the one I define as most relevant for the legitimacy 
of the ANC government, namely charismatic authority. Charismatic authority is given 
the leader's personal character and gifts. The leadership demands no rationale, no rules 
but the word of the leader. The leadership is executed on an irrational case-to-case 
basis. The legitimate authority continues as long as the disciples and the masses 
believe in the power given the charismatic leader. The source of the charismatic 
authority comes from the “outside”, like a god or a higher ideology. The charismatic 
leader is typically a prophet, a demagogue or warrior hero (Weber 1971: 100). The 
leader needs to prove his or her authority through successes (Ibid). If the outcomes of 
the leadership are not satisfactory to the people, the authority of the leader will decline. 
The charismatic authority only exists as long as the leader has the needed charisma and 
as long as the ruled believe in the leader’s authority. When the leader looses power it 
doesn’t necessarily disappear, it may continue in another way (Ibid: 101).  
 
When the authority is transferred from a present leader to a successor there is a 
tendency of what Weber has labeled “routinization of the charismatic authority”. This 
tendency is significant to South Africa because of the development of the ANC from a 
liberation movement with Nelson Mandela as a leader, to a governing political party 
with Thabo Mbeki in charge. When a routinization of authority takes place the 
authority follows the succeeding leader either by making the structures of power 
traditional, by the transition of the charismatic staff into a legal staff, or by a 
transformation of the meaning of charisma itself (Ibid: 101-102). A transformation of 
the meaning of charisma is especially relevant in the question of finding a successor. 
With a change in leadership where the power of one leader is transferred to the 
succeeding leader, the authority follows not the person, but the position as a leader, the 
authority will be inherited by the next leader. Therefore the strong focus on person will 
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 disappear, hence a transformation of the charismatic authority, a routinization of it. 
The successor may be pointed out, either by the old leader or by the charismatic 
administrative staff, or may follow a blood line (Ibid: 102-103). The question of 
finding a successor can also be solved in an anti-authoritarian way. The validity of the 
charismatic rule is based on the acknowledgement of the leader by the ruled (Ibid: 
104). This support is expected by the charismatic leader, but can easily be transformed 
into democratic support through an election where the ruled give their support to the 
leader voluntarily with their vote. Like this an authoritarian rule based of charisma can 
turn into a democratic rule based on an election.  
 
If a dominant power does not build on one of these forms of authority or any 
combination of them, power will soon be regarded as illegitimate by the subordinates 
(Hagtvet 1978: 250). 
3.3 Conservation of authority - Loyalty 
Loyalty creates a tie between the dominant and the subordinate. This tie will slow 
down the process of declining authority of the dominant, and will keep the relationship 
of dominant-subordinate longer than the legitimate authority will (Hagtvet 1978:247). 
Loyalty preserves the authority of the dominant. A people liberated from an 
authoritarian regime by an organization may feel a bond, or loyalty to that 
organization.  
3.4 David Beetham: Legitimacy 
In “The Legitimation of Power” (1991), David Beetham emphasizes the 
multidimensionality of legitimacy. He extracts three dimensions of legitimacy: 
established rules, shared beliefs and expressed consent. Legitimate power has to 
recognize all three dimensions. 
 
The dimension of established rules is built on the concept of state sovereignty. This is 
the basis of all modern states, and this legality is widely recognized in all democracies 
today. The rules are expressed in the Constitution and the laws. Preconditions for 
 34
 legitimate, legal governing are: the effective independence of the judiciary from the 
legislative and the executive branches of the state, and military subordination to 
civilian control (Beetham 1991: 122-124). The sovereignty is limited by super-state 
institutions. 
 
Shared beliefs are the beliefs which are underlying the constitution. The beliefs are not 
about who governs, but about what kind of government system the citizens live in. The 
shared beliefs expressed in the constitution need an authoritative source on which they 
build, for instance an election in a democracy or the principle of heredity in a 
monarchy (Beetham 1991: 126-127). The only legitimate authoritative source today is 
based on the will of the people (Ibid: 128). The power that governs will also need to 
express some sort of general interest (Ibid: 135). It is not a question of every citizen 
having to agree with the policies of the government, but they have to agree with the 
system where the policy is performed. The citizens must accept subordinance to the 
national government as such, even though they voted for the party that lost the 
competition for power. If the government does not consider the general interest of the 
minority at all, the system will be in danger of loosing legitimacy because the minority 
will not accept subordinance to a government which they think is unfair and 
unreasonable.  
 
A manifest failure of performance by the government may compromise the legitimacy 
based on shared beliefs. This is relevant in a country like South Africa where there is a 
huge inequality between a rich minority and a poor majority. Another reason for 
legitimacy deficit based on this source of legitimacy is abuse of public office for 
private gain, like corruption (Ibid: 142). The shared beliefs will justify differentiation 
in society between the dominant and the subordinate (Beetham 1991: 59). The 
inequality will be explained either through merit or inheritance. The position of the 
bureaucracy as a traditionally well positioned group is explained by their 
qualifications. It is because of their knowledge they are in power. A king is a dominant 
because of his inherited position. Also the discrimination of women in many societies 
is explained by the inherited dominant position of men. If the subordinates do not se a 
 35
 reason for the differentiation, the inequality will seem unfair, and the government will 
loose legitimacy.  
 
Expressed consent gives legitimacy to power either through an election or through 
mobilization (Beetham 1991: 151). Consent as a dimension of legitimacy is a 
continuation of the philosophical thought of a social contract between the leaders and 
the citizens. It expresses a voluntary subordination to power or authority. It must be 
expressed by positive action, not inaction. For consent to be voluntary it requires an 
effective choice between alternatives (Ibid: 151-2). South Africa has got one very 
strong party mobilizing a great majority of the votes, the ANC, and a small and 
fragmented opposition. Therefore the question of a real choice and a real competition 
for power is very present. In the next chapter I therefore include some theories about 
the competition for power.  
 
In a one-party system without alternatives, mobilization can also be used as an attempt 
of legitimating the government. Demonstrations of mass popular support can be 
misused by authoritarian governments if it orders the citizens to attend the meetings. In 
the last years of apartheid South Africa, there was a legitimacy crisis because only a 
small minority of the citizens got to express their opinion, or consent in a broad sense 
(Ibid.: 153). In analyzing authoritarian regimes, Beetham claims that Weber’s concept 
of charismatic authority is “rather a hindrance than a help” (1991: 156). He claims that 
the personality of the leader is not enough for having authority; it demands a special 
system of power, and of mobilizing for legitimacy.  
 
In a democracy elections give the government legitimacy both by expressing support 
for one specific government which is given power to govern, but an election is also 
giving legitimacy to the democratic system. By using the channels of the democracy to 
elect representatives to be in government, the citizens legitimize not only the specific 
government, but also the system of representative democracy.  
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 3.5 Theories on competition for power 
South Africa is a multi party democracy. An important feature to make the 
government deliver in a democracy is that the government is accountable to the 
electorate, and that if the electorate is not satisfied with the government, it is not 
reelected. With the ANC being so strong in South Africa it is a question of whether 
this control mechanism is effective. I discuss three theories which are relevant for the 
competition for power in South Africa. The first theory is on “political space”. I use it 
to explore the potential for a stronger opposition in South Africa. The second one is 
about the need for substantive uncertainty in a democracy, which is about the 
uncertainty that makes politicians accountable to their electorate. The last theory is the 
“iron law of oligarchy”, which states that an organization, in this case the ANC, can 
not remain democratic; the leaders will do what they can to remain in power even if it 
includes using undemocratic means. These theories explore different factors which are 
decisive for a consolidation of the South African democracy. They explain the 
institutions for where the people can express their beliefs, and thereby legitimize the 
government.  
Linz: Political space 
Linz explores political space in connection with the success of the fascist movements 
in the different European countries after World War 1 (Linz 1980). Instead of using 
economic development, as is commonly used to explain the success or failure of the 
fascist movements in the different countries, he explains them with fascism being a 
late-comer among the political ideologies and with the political space available for 
fascism in the different countries (Linz 1980: 173). Political space can also be 
described as the potential for mobilization. In an authoritarian regime, where there is 
no room for organizations or parties, the potential mobilization is zero (Ibid: 155). In a 
society where one or some parties have mobilized a great majority of the population, 
the potential mobilization for new organizations is little. If there is limited political 
space, there is less chance of a new ideology or a new opposition party to get support. 
If the structures of a society are changing, new political space may be opened. Where 
for instance a new middle class is developing, it opens for mobilization, either by old 
parties or organizations, or by new (Ibid: 167).  
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 Habib: Substantive Uncertainty 
Adam Habib describes uncertainty as the essence of democracy (Habib 2005: 46). 
There are two kinds of uncertainty: institutional and substantive. Institutional 
uncertainty is bad and describes a democracy’s vulnerability to anti-democratic forces 
and their possible return to authoritarianism (Habib 2005: 47). Most of the literature on 
the young democracies from the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991: 3-5) 
is preoccupied with this kind of uncertainty.  
 
The other kind of uncertainty is substantive uncertainty. This is positive uncertainty 
and is the kind that keeps the politicians alert and makes them responsive to their 
citizenry (Habib 2005: 47). The problem of the democracies in the third wave is that 
they have weak institutional mechanisms to promote substantive uncertainty like 
legislative elections, the separation of powers, civil liberties, oppositional political 
parties and an independent press (Ibid). A threat to substantive uncertainty is that 
citizens are reluctant to vote against their liberators out of fear that the authoritarian 
regime will return if the liberators are not ruling. Another result of this fear is that the 
new democratic regimes make concessions and compromises with the old regime and 
old economic elites. The majority of the electorate is voting for the liberators anyway, 
Habib calls it the “honeymoon phenomenon”. The new regime needs investment to get 
economic growth, therefore the government rules in accordance with the interests of 
business more than in the interests of the population (Ibid: 43). This leads to neo-
liberal economic strategies and weak social security for the population. Habib 
concludes that one needs substantive uncertainty for real competition for votes in a 
democracy and for the politicians to look after the people’s interests.  
Michels: Iron Law of Oligarchy 
Michels defined the “Iron law of oligarchy” in 1911: “It is organization which gives 
birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the 
mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization says 
oligarchy” (Michels 1962: 365). The core of it is that organization leads to 
authoritarianism. Once in office, the organization of bureaucracy makes the elites 
powerful, and thereby able to hold on to the power they’ve got. This way any 
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 organization will end up being governed by an oligarchy because of the leaders’ 
interests and efforts to stay in power. Even if a leader is democratically elected, he or 
she can change rules, influence the administration and thereby stay in power. There are 
several examples of leaders changing rules which are supposed to limit their power; 
one is an elected president with a time limit for ruling who changes the law to be able 
to remain in power. Unfortunately this has happened more than once in Africa, most 
recently in Uganda in September 2005. President Yoweri Museweni has amended the 
Ugandan constitution in to be able to sit a third term, whereas it originally limited 
presidential terms to two (New Vision September 29th 2005 [newspaper]). 
 
People employed through the ruling party also have personal reasons for trying to keep 
the party in power. Out of fear that they will loose their jobs if the party looses power 
they are working to keep the power (Lipset 1962: 17-18). 
 
In “Union Democracy” (1956) Lipset describes the democracy in the International 
Typographical Union (ITU) as an exception from the “iron law of oligarchy”. The 
most important factor for avoiding an oligarchic development in an organization is a 
legitimate opposition, which was the case in the ITU. Such an opposition may develop 
when the organization is exposed to a crisis. A crisis is any “large disruption of routine 
in the life of the union” (Lipset 1956: 142). This may result in fractioning inside the 
organization, and thereby competition for power. The opposition starts as illegitimate, 
but becomes legitimate when it gains support in the organization. 
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 4. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF LEGITIMACY 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters I have introduced the framework of this thesis. I have 
explained the relevant South African background, the history and the actors, and how 
it has influenced today’s South Africa. I have also presented the theoretical framework 
which will form the analysis. In this chapter I will extract the relevant variables for the 
discussion. I build on two main hypotheses which I think are crucial for the 
development of the South African democracy. The first one is that when a government 
does not deliver socioeconomically, they must have some kind of authority to back 
them up. The second hypothesis is that a functioning democracy demands competition 
for power. From these I extract the variables for discussion in the next two chapters 
before I move on to the question of the extent of legitimacy in the final chapter.  
4.2 Authority and delivery 
In a democracy a government must deliver to be legitimate. In an authoritarian regime, 
the government may justify their power in other ways. The Ayatollah of Iran falls back 
on religion if he does not deliver, while communist states fall back on the ideology of 
communism and the higher good when they do not deliver. In a democracy the 
government’s power exists on the mercy of the people, so it must see to it that their 
interests are considered, at least the interests of the majority and the main interests in 
society. Afrobarometer surveys even show that Africans evaluate democracy 
according to delivery more than in the Western world (February 2005: 56). Therefore I 
start with a discussion on the delivery of the ANC Government, and then I ask what 
their source of authority is to the extent that they do not deliver.  
Efficacy and effectiveness 
South Africa is one of the economically most unequal societies in the world. The ANC 
has been in government for more than 10 years, and they have not been able to change 
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 this situation. The question is of course how much the ANC government does deliver. 
This is a question about the outcomes of their policy, i.e. the results the people see 
from their policies or their effectiveness. The other side of delivery is a question of 
whether the constituency trusts the ANC’s ability to solve the problems, in other 
words, their efficacy. 
 
The ANC does face a problem, seeing that half of the population lives under the 
national poverty line, and that this has not changed in their period of being in 
Government. Even so, the poor continue to vote for the ANC, so the Government’s 
authority must build on something else than their effectiveness. For each national 
election the ANC has increased their percentage of the vote. 
 
Since the ANC has introduced democracy in South Africa, and equal rights for its 
citizens, I assume that the population believes in the ANC’s ability to solve problems, 
i.e. their efficacy. But they may have an increasing problem when it comes to the 
effectiveness of their policy. My hypothesis is that this will eventually influence 
people’s belief in the ANC’s efficacy if the government does not perform 
socioeconomically. I will discuss this in chapter 5.  
Focus on charismatic authority 
In chapter 5 I argue that one major source for the legitimacy of the ANC government 
is charismatic authority. A government’s authority does not only have one source. For 
the ANC government’s authority there are elements of Weber’s other kinds of 
authority too. Legal-rational authority is essential in a modern state. The power of a 
democratic government must be justified through rules which are made by a 
democratic Parliament. It also needs an administration that treats the inhabitants 
without discrimination and with decisions based on law. In South Africa the 
government administration is criticized of being incompetent because it is recruited on 
the basis of skin color in addition to merit. This is because of “affirmative action”; 
black people are preferred when people are employed because of under-representation 
of Blacks in government (Department of Labour 2005 [homepage]). This causes 
debate in South Africa, mostly in relation to the satisfaction of the general interests. 
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 The problem is that all non-blacks are second in line when employed; I will discuss 
this briefly in chapter 7. Affirmative action may possibly cause a legitimacy deficit for 
the government administration based on the rational-legal authority and the principle 
of recruiting on the basis of merit. But on the other hand it is a problem for the 
credibility for the government administration if it only consists of white people with 
experience from the apartheid days. I will not discuss that in this thesis. The power of 
the government is based on rules. I will assume that an eventual legitimacy deficit for 
the ANC government based on decline in the legal-rational authority is small.  
 
I will not discuss traditional authority of the ANC government either. The ANC 
government may have a certain traditional authority among the people living in the 
rural areas of South Africa, in cultures which are used to listening to the “counsel of 
the elderly”, and accepting a decision once it is taken. Like this it may be a hindrance 
for a viable opposition. When some of the people I spoke to in Khayelitsha did not 
follow me in analyzing the government (Khayelitsha 2005, no 4 and 5 [interviews]), it 
may have been because they thought of the government as a guardian that was doing 
its best to see to their interests. This could be because of traditional authority. In the 
thesis I still assume that this is not the most important form of authority for the ANC 
Government. The reasoning behind it is that the ANC has not been in government long 
enough to establish such authority, and that the apartheid government claimed to rule 
on the basis of traditional authority, but was not considered legitimate in South Africa.  
 
I have chosen to concentrate on the charismatic authority of the ANC because I think 
this is the most relevant source of authority for the ANC. It is also a very interesting 
one because there will probably be a change in it in the years to come. Therefore it is 
crucial for the development of South African democracy.  
4.3 Competition for power 
In Robert A. Dahl’s minimalist definition of democracy there are two components: 
contestation and participation (Dahl 1971). The turnout for South Africa is usually 
considered high, but I will argue that because of limitations in registering for the 
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 voters’ roll it is lower than is usually assumed. Still, many people are participating in 
the South African democracy. I argue that the degree of contestation is a bigger 
problem. 
 
In chapter 2 I have shown that the struggle and the transition have left South Africa 
with a very strong ANC. According to Juan Linz a strong ANC is causing a weak 
opposition because of a limited political space (Linz 1980). In South Africa there are 
many opposition parties, but they do not get many votes. I will look at the strong ANC 
and the weak South African opposition in the light of political space. I do not only 
look at party opposition, but also at issue-based opposition like social movements.  
 
If the political space in a democracy is mobilized mainly by one actor it leaves little 
competition for power, and this may constitute a problem for the legitimacy of a 
government. If people are to express their consent with a government, which is one of 
Beetham’s dimensions of legitimacy, it requires a real choice of alternative 
governments (Beetham 1991). In Habib’s words it is a question of substantive 
uncertainty, which he describes as the essence of a democracy (Habib 2005). For 
South Africa this leaves a discussion on the implications of the ANC getting such a 
strong support, and the opposition being so weak.  
 
When looking at the competition for power in chapter 6 I include a discussion of 
electoral behavior. With the history of the ANC as a liberation movement, I assume 
that the constituency is loyal to the ANC and that it identifies with the ANC. This 
makes them vote for the ANC longer than they would have done otherwise, loyalty 
thus limits the potential competition for power by continuing to give the ANC support.  
 
The last discussion I include on competition for power is Michels’ “iron law of 
oligarchy”. Are the leaders of the ANC who are in positions of power now willing to 
give it up? Thabo Mbeki has been accused of having centralized the government and 
having an authoritarian style of leading. If this is so, the ANC is moving away from 
democratic principles and decision-making structures. A way of limiting the 
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 possibility of the development of oligarchy inside an organization is a “legitimate 
opposition” in the organization. Since the ANC has to consider the views of its 
partners in the Tripartite Alliance when governing, I will discuss whether this can be 
regarded as legitimate opposition in chapter 6.  
4.4 Legitimate? 
The discussions from chapter 5 and 6 will be concluded in the last chapter. I will start 
with looking at the source of the authority of the ANC. In chapter 5 I argued that an 
important source of the authority is charisma, and in the final chapter I will argue that 
it is changing, and that this change is crucial for the future legitimacy of the South 
African government. I will discuss what Weber calls the routinization of charisma. 
 
I will look at David Beetham’s dimensions of legitimacy (Beetham 1991). I will not go 
into the first dimension, established rules. This dimension of legitimacy builds on a 
sovereign state where the judiciary is independent from the other state powers and a 
military subordination to civilian control. According to Freedom House, the South 
African judiciary is independent (Freedom House 2005 [homepage]). The military is 
subordinated to civilian control, but crime and violence are major problems in South 
Africa. It is one of the countries in the world which has the highest number of rapes 
and armed robberies per capita (Ibid.). A high number of illegal firearms are 
circulating in the country. This is a problem for the ANC government, but I will not 
discuss it here. I find Beetham’s other two dimensions of legitimacy more relevant for 
my research question. 
 
From the dimension Beetham has called “shared beliefs” I discuss if the government 
can be said to consider the general interests of the South Africans. I pick up the 
discussion from chapter 5 on how the ANC government has delivered, and what the 
implications are for their legitimacy. Another aspect of shared beliefs which is relevant 
for South Africa is if there exits a South African national identity. A legitimate 
government demands that the citizens accept subordination to it, that the citizens feel a 
shared identity and part of the same state. The divided history of South Africa makes it 
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 questionable if there is a South African national identity. There are institutions which 
are building up under it, but the country has only got eleven years of shared history, 
and the different cultures are still much separated. It is a long discussion, and I will not 
go into it in this thesis. Even if the existence of a South African national identity is 
questionable, I presuppose that the citizens of South Africa accept subordination to the 
government. Participation through democratic channels rather than revolting is one 
sign that they do. Surveys also show that a majority of the population see themselves 
as South Africans first, and not belonging to a race (Khosa 2005: 145). This is a sign 
that South Africans feel part of the same country, and thus feel that they belong under 
the same government.   
 
The other dimension of legitimacy I will discuss is what Beetham calls expressed 
consent. Following the discussion in chapter 6, I argue that for South Africans to be 
able to express their consent, they must have a real choice of alternatives. The strong 
ANC in South Africa and the little political space which is left for the opposition 
leaves a question if there is a real choice of alternative governments in South Africa. 
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 5. THE FUNDAMENT OF AUTHORITY 
William Gumede notes that the only “difference between [the poor South Africans’] 
miserable lives under apartheid and their miserable lives under democracy is that they 
have the right to vote” (Gumede 2005: 285). Still the ANC got 70 percent of the votes 
in the election in 2004, of which a majority was votes from poor people. What is 
backing the ANC government up to keep the support from the voters? I assume that 
many people are not satisfied with their socioeconomic situation. The Afrobarometer 
survey from 2001 shows that Africans in general judge their governments much 
according to what the government delivers (February 2005: 56). In this chapter I will 
look at the delivery of the ANC government and show that their efficacy is stronger 
than their effectiveness. In the last half of the chapter I will argue that ANC’s authority 
is based on charisma, and that it is still strong today.  
5.1 Effectiveness and Efficacy 
Effectiveness 
The ANC has governed South Africa for a little more than a decade. They introduced 
democracy and equal rights to the country, but socioeconomically there is still huge 
inequality. The ANC has delivered in some fields, but still a lot is missing. Even 
people associated with the ANC, like Desmond Tutu, have criticized the 
Government’s effort to reduce poverty (Tutu 2004 [speech]). If people grow impatient 
with the government it may lead to social unrest and revolt.  In Linz’ words, the ANC 
government’s effectiveness has not been sufficient during the first decade of 
democracy.  
 
Since the ANC got in power in 1994, they have given the poor in South Africa quite a 
number of material improvements. They have built 1.6 million low cost houses, given 
9 million people access to clean water and 2 million people electricity (Mattes 2005:2). 
Not all people have access to these services because there is a service charge to get 
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 them. To get a government built house people have to pay for the improved access to 
water and electricity. When people fall behind with their payments they are forced to 
either rent their house out or to sell it (People’s Budget 2005: 6). 
 
The ANC government is criticized of not delivering in South Africa. The economic 
growth has not been as high as they promised, which was the precondition for a high 
scale job creation. Even though the economic strategies, RDP and GEAR, have 
promised more jobs, the result has been that half a million jobs have disappeared in 
total (Mattes 2005: 1). At the same time the government has realized the fiscal targets 
as set out in GEAR (Tørres 2005: 59). This implies that the government has delivered 
according to the business interests more than in the interests of the 40 percent 
unemployed in South Africa. 
 
The Afrobarometer survey shows that in 2002 more South Africans gave a negative 
assessment of their own economy (46 percent) than positive (38 percent). About 30 
percent said their economic situation had improved the last year, and an equal 
proportion said it had deteriorated (Mattes et al 2003: 17). South Africans are positive 
about their future. More than 40 percent believed that their living conditions would get 
better the next year, while only 13 percent thought they would worsen. Also the people 
I spoke to in Khayelitsha had a positive view of the future. All but one (no 1) thought 
that their or their children’s lives would be better in the future (Khayelitsha 2005 
[interviews]).  
 
Numbers from the UNDP show that half the population lives under the national 
poverty line (UNDP 2003: 70). This has not changed since the introduction of 
democracy. When South Africans are positive about the future, it is not because they 
have seen big socioeconomic improvements in the past. This leads us to the question 
of the ANC’s efficacy. 
Efficacy 
Afrobarometer data shows that South Africans believe in the ANC. Not only do they 
have an optimistic view of the future, they also think that the government can solve 
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 their problems. Almost 60 percent of the population answered that they thought the 
government could solve all or almost all of the country’s problems (Mattes et al 2003: 
12). Another 30 percent believed they could solve some of them. The people I talked 
to in Khayelitsha trusted the ANC’s solutions because of their history as liberators. 
The ANC did bring people freedom and equal rights through democracy. This has 
made them believe in the ANC and their ability to make a change. One of the people I 
spoke to in Khayelitsha said that she believes that the ANC will keep all the promises 
they have made of change, but it will take time. But people are patient, they know it 
will come (Khayelitsha 2005, no 7 [interview]). Even though the ANC government has 
not yet improved poor people’s economic situation, the people do believe in their 
ability to make a difference. 
 
On the other hand there are signs of growing dissatisfaction with the government’s 
efficacy, especially with their economic strategies. A number of social movements 
have come into being since the late nineties, and they mobilize a great number of 
people. There are major COSATU demonstrations on a monthly basis, especially with 
demands on increased effort by the government to create jobs (Mail and Guardian, 
June 24th).  
 
The ANC’s economic policy has changed quite radically since 1994. ANC’s first 
economic strategy was described in the Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955 at the 
Congress of the People at Kliptown (Terreblanche 2002: 346). The Charter simply 
states that “The People Shall Share the Country’s Wealth!” (Freedom Charter 1955, 
paragraph 4). It also prescribes a policy of nationalization of the resources of South 
Africa by stating that the resources “…shall be transferred to the ownership of the 
people as a whole” (Ibid.). The Freedom Charter is not detailed; it is a vision rather 
than a description of a policy.   
 
In cooperation with COSATU the ANC formed a new economic strategy, the 
Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), adopted in 1994. The base line of the 
RDP is growth through redistribution. The RDP emphasizes that the basic needs of all 
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 South Africans must be fulfilled, that the economy must be built, legacies of apartheid 
must be redressed and that South Africa must adjust to the global market.  
 
In 1996 the government introduced a new economic strategy, officially as a follow-up 
of the RDP (GEAR 1996:3), but in reality a shift of strategy. GEAR’s focus was on 
economic growth and liberalization. High government spending in the last years of the 
apartheid regime had left the country with a huge international debt. GEAR prescribes 
a recipe for the economic crises of attracting foreign direct investment and a higher 
domestic saving effort (GEAR 1996: 22). It calls for industrial competitiveness and a 
tight fiscal stance. It turns the “growth through redistribution” from the RDP around to 
become “redistribution through growth”. It was assumed that economic growth in 
South Africa would “trickle down” on the poor (Terreblanche 2002: 97). Where RDP 
contains visions of human development and democracy, GEAR has ideals of economic 
growth through high competition and opening to the global market.  
 
In 2003, in the weekly “Letter from the President” Thabo Mbeki introduces a new 
strategy which is more interventionalist than GEAR was (Mbeki 2003). The 
government adopted a terminology for the South African economy of “two 
economies” of the country. The “two economies” is not really an economic strategy, it 
is an understanding of the South African economy, but it has become a strategy in the 
way it has been adopted by the government, the media and business since it was 
introduced (e-politics 2005, edition 1: 9). The two economies stem from the apartheid 
system, where one, White, economy was developed as a modern, western economy, 
while the rest of the people of South Africa was left without economic development in 
a third world economy. The two economies are still present in the country, where a 
minority of the population is part of the formal economy, also called the first world 
economy, and a majority is excluded from it. The third world, or second economy, 
includes the informal sector. The two economies have very much stayed separated, 
also during the first ten years after the transition. The problem is that a majority of the 
South African population belongs to the third world economy, and does not get to be 
part of the first world economy. Thabo Mbeki explains the use of the two economies in 
 49
 today’s South Africa as a way of being able to mend the gap between the economies 
by using the economic growth of the first economy to intervene in the second one 
(Mbeki 2003). While GEAR was assuming a “trickle down” effect of the economic 
growth upon the poor, the strategy of the “two economies” prescribes intervention in 
the second economy. 
 
The Government’s economic strategies all have as main goals reducing inequality, 
creating jobs and creating the structures for economic growth. The focus of the public 
economic strategies has turned from being on social services to being on economic 
growth. From the RDP to GEAR there is a much greater emphasize on economic 
growth and specific economic goals, and a belief in that equal redistribution will come 
as a result from growth. With the jargon of the two economies, the goal is to integrate 
the second economy into the first. The first economy is for the business and the 
economic elite, and this is where the economic growth of South Africa is found. It is 
also much more deracialized than the second economy is; the elites in South Africa are 
the ones who are the most “colorblind”. The talk of the two economies is by some seen 
as an opportunity to build a bridge between them, but by others as a way of cementing 
the two economies. Cementing the two economies implies that the first economy is left 
untouched while one is only patching up the second one, without doing anything about 
the structures which create them (Habib 2005: 42). In this sense the use of the jargon 
of the two economies is maintaining the system it is meant to be changing. 
 
Many of the young democracies in the world are experiencing a market-liberalist shift 
in economic policy. Adam Habib explains it with new democratic governments being 
able to expect strong support in elections after a transition. The ANC can take an 
overwhelming support in the national elections for granted. This makes them able to 
consider business interests to get investment without fear of loosing power (Habib 
2005: 43). Increasing visible dissatisfaction in South Africa like strikes and mass 
demonstrations may be a sign of this period coming to an end, even though the ANC 
does not seem to need to fear loosing votes yet. The reason for this may be the loyalty 
people feel with the ANC, which I will return to in chapter 5.4. 
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Another problem for government efficacy has been the HIV/ Aids problem. About 10 
percent of the South African population is HIV infected in 20058 (StatsSA 2005 
[homepage]). A majority is poor, which makes the impact of the disease even bigger. 
It reduces the household’s earning power and it increases the burden on government 
services. The government is now providing free anti-retroviral treatment to people who 
test positive for HIV or Aids, and is not giving controversial statements as often as it 
once did, but it is still not clear on the cause and treatment of the disease. Health 
minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang stated in May 2005 that HIV patients should 
have the option of using traditional healing, and especially eat garlic, and that this not 
only helps against HIV and Aids, but also a range of other diseases (Mail and 
Guardian, June 28th 2005). Such statements confuse the whole world, it misleads the 
focus of the problem and it gives an impression that the government does not do its 
best to fight the disease.  
5.2 Khayelitsha 
All my interviewees were very pleased with the ANC in government, when asked if 
they thought the government did a good job, all ten answered positive. In general the 
answers were centered on freedom, the government has given them freedom, they can 
be where they want, go to school wherever they want, work wherever they want 
(Khayelitsha 2005, no 2, 3, 7, 9 and 10 [Interviews]). Some mentioned rights, that 
everybody has rights (no 10), and that women have been given rights they didn’t have 
before (no 1). When I asked about what the government had done for them and their 
community, four answers included building houses (no 1, 7, 8 and 9) and others 
mentioned social grants (no 6 and 7), education (no 1 and 9) and electricity (no 6). 
 
Many of the same things were mentioned when I asked about what the government 
could do better. Housing was the thing that the most mentioned when asked about 
what the government did well, but also mentioned by two when asked about what 
could be done better (no 1 and 3). Both said that monitoring of the money that was 
                                                 
8 16.7 percent of the population between 15 and 49 years in HIV infected.  
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 supposed to use for building houses was not good enough. They think that a share of 
the money disappears on its way from being given from the government on the 
national level, going through the provincial government, and finally being used by the 
local government to build houses. Both interviewees no 1 and 3 are active in 
community work. On what the government could do better, the interviewees also 
answered that they should create more jobs, do more to prevent youth from 
committing crime and HIV/ Aids (mentioned by no 3 and 9). One also criticized the 
use of social grants, because it makes people dependent for instance by encouraging 
teenage pregnancies (no 1). Another interviewee mentioned service charges, they have 
“water meters” which measure the amount of water they use, and they have to pay 
subsequently. According to interview no 5 the problem is that there is debt on the 
water from before they installed the water meters, so they have to pay more than just 
for the water they use. It would help the poor if they could start at zero, instead of 
having to pay old debt. Another said that the houses built by the government are too 
small (no 6).  
 
Five of the ten interviewees said something about corruption, or politicians being after 
their own gain (no 1, 3, 5, 6 and 8). Politicians gave all the jobs available to their own 
family or friends or they were just trying to get power for themselves. But all of them 
also said that they thought that these were bad apples; there were many good 
politicians, only some were corrupt. 
 
The people I talked to believed in the efficacy of the ANC. The ANC has done much, 
and they trust them to be able to make things even better. They did talk a lot of history 
and Nelson Mandela, the charismatic authority of the ANC is prominent. For the 
people I spoke to these factors outweigh the fact that they are not as pleased with the 
effectiveness of the ANC, they trust that they will deliver in time, they have patience.  
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 5.3 Authority of the ANC 
Charisma  
So, what is backing the ANC up where it doesn’t deliver to the poor? Why do the 
people I talked to in Khayelitsha still believe that the ANC will fulfill their promises, 
what makes them wait patiently? The ANC must have some kind of authority in the 
eyes of the people that make them trust the Government. I will argue that this authority 
is what Weber calls charismatic authority. In chapter 7 I will argue that the crucial 
point for the legitimacy of the government is a routinization of this authority.  
 
One reason for ANC’s authority being much based on charisma is its history as a 
liberation movement, and the leaders and symbols that are part of it. The source of a 
charismatic authority comes from “outside”, for instance from a higher ideology 
(Weber 1971). ANC’s source of charismatic authority is liberty and freedom. During 
the struggle, freedom and ANC were synonyms when talking about South Africa. The 
ANC was fighting for a free South Africa and for the freedom for the political 
prisoners, the most famous being Nelson Mandela. When an organization is defined as 
a liberation movement, it gets moral right on its side. It is fighting to liberate a 
population from an oppressive and illegitimate regime. This gives it charismatic 
authority in itself. People trust an organization which they believe to do the right thing, 
fighting for the right cause. In most conflicts where one or several organizations call 
themselves liberation movements, the term is debatable. There is no worldwide 
agreement that the ETA movement in Spain or the SPLM/SPLA in Sudan are 
liberation movements. But during the apartheid regime in South Africa, the ANC was 
widely recognized as a liberation movement. The suppression of people because of the 
skin color was illegitimate in the world opinion. No matter how much the apartheid 
regime tried to break up the organization of ANC, by banning it and imprisoning its 
leaders, it had wide support throughout the world.  
 
Another side of the same argument is that a regime like the apartheid regime which 
was seen as defending something very illegitimate and morally wrong, will loose 
authority. The UN Security Counsel contributed to its delegitimation in 1989 when it 
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 stated that apartheid was a crime against humanity and a gross violation of human 
rights (UN Resolution 1989: 44/69). As obvious as the brutality of the apartheid 
government was, as obvious was the fair cause of the ANC. Thus ANC gained 
authority from a moral source, while the apartheid government lost authority. 
 
The leader as a person is very important for charismatic authority (Weber 1971: 98). 
The leader is for instance a prophet or a hero. Nelson Mandela is still a hero in most 
people’s eyes. One of my interviewees said “Only Mandela prevented fighting and 
brought a peaceful transition” (Khayelitsha 2005, no 8 [interview]). Another said “he 
is speaking of forgive and forget” (Ibid no 1). His ability to reconcile with his former 
oppressors and enemies is also regarded as one of his heroic capabilities. He has made 
friends with the former prison wards, he has dined with apartheid leaders, and in 1993 
he accepted the Nobel Peace Prize together with the last President of the apartheid 
Government, Frederik Willem de Klerk (The Norwegian Nobel Institute 2005 
[homepage]). 
 
Mandela was imprisoned for almost three decades, much of the time at Robben Island, 
the prison island. For almost three decades, while imprisoned, it was illegal 
photographing him. There was a lot of speculation as to what he would look like, and 
because there were no new ones, the pictures taken of him in the 60’s were used on 
posters and cards in the anti-apartheid campaigns over the world. This also contributed 
to building the picture of the hero Mandela, mystified because no-one knew what he 
looked like and forever young because the same pictures were used for more than 20 
years. 
 
When Mandela got out of prison in 1990, his authority increased. He is credited with 
much of the successful and mostly non-violent transition to democracy, and the 
negotiated fall of the apartheid regime. Mandela also managed to gather support for 
the first democratic election in South Africa, where people waited patient in long lines 
to vote, the longest being in the black areas. One of the people I interviewed said: “I 
will continue to vote for the ANC, even if Mandela passes away” (Khayelitsha 2005, 
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 no 6 [Interview]). This is an example of how strongly people connect Mandela with 
the ANC, and also how important he is to people. Mandela is still an important figure 
in South African politics, still commenting on issues where he thinks Mbeki and the 
government are not doing a good enough job, like in the HIV/Aids question. 
 
Another aspect underlining the charismatic source of authority of the ANC is the 
symbols used during the struggle, which are still in use today. A speaker cries out to 
the people: “Amandla!” (Power), and the crowd answers “Ngawethu!” (To the 
people). This has been a cry from the oppressed people during the apartheid regime, 
but today it is a slogan to show support for the new regime, for democracy. Similar 
symbols are the raised fist, which Mandela calls the “Greeting of Africa” (Mandela 
1994: picture between p 320 and 321) and the dance called toyi-toyi, which was used 
as a protest dance during mass demonstrations against apartheid and became a symbol 
for the struggle. The song “Nkosi Sikelel iAfrica” was regarded as the national anthem 
of the oppressed in South Africa, and was used as the anthem at ANC meetings (ANC 
2005 [homepage]). Today it is the national anthem of South Africa, translated from 
originally only being in Xhosa, to now having four verses in four languages: Xhosa, 
Zulu, Afrikaans and English. 
 
The paradox of these symbols from the liberation fight is that today the symbols are 
also used in strikes and actions against the ANC government, for instance in COSATU 
mass demonstrations. The symbols are used against the dominant power rather than 
only in favor of the ANC. This may be a sign of the declining charismatic authority of 
the ANC. The higher ideology of liberation and freedom, and the moral right may 
gradually be separating from the ANC, whereas it has been integrated since the 
struggle. 
 
Beetham argues that Weber’s concept of charismatic authority focuses too much on 
the leader as a person where it should have a broader perspective (Beetham 1991: 
156). He argues that it takes the right leader inside a belief system, not only the leader, 
to give one person that kind of authority. Leaders like Hitler, Lenin and Mao all used 
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 the popular resistance against the former regime to gain power. It takes more than just 
the personality; they needed popular belief and institutions that made them able to get 
power. Even though Beetham discusses charismatic authority in authoritarian regimes, 
it can be applied on charismatic authority in general. 
 
For South Africa Nelson Mandela was this right person at the right time inside the 
right belief systems and institutions. He had the charismatic authority as described by 
Weber. He was the given leader of the charismatic movement when the ANC was 
unbanned, being a hero from the struggle and having very special personal abilities, 
especially in communicating with people. It was not only Mandela who brought the 
fall of the apartheid regime. There were many important organizations inside South 
Africa, there was an increasing international pressure, and there was the end of the 
cold war reducing the world’s fear of communism - all these different factors 
contributed to the fall of the apartheid regime. If these factors had not occurred at the 
time they did, apartheid would probably have fallen at another point in time, maybe 
sooner, maybe later.  But as it happened when it did, Mandela was the released 
prisoner and the hero from the struggle and he had the right charisma and personality 
to be a unifying leader.  
 
Charismatic authority only exists as long as the leader has the needed charisma. The 
charismatic authority of the ANC may apply as long as Mandela is still alive. With 
time it will decline. Charisma as a source for authority of the ANC government has 
declined with Thabo Mbeki succeeding Mandela both as President and as leader of the 
ANC in 1999. The ANC government has a lot of authority even without Mandela 
because of the struggle and because of it having been a liberation movement. This 
supports Beetham’s argument; the organization has authority because of a long 
resistance and fight against apartheid. Also before Nelson Mandela became an 
important political actor in South Africa, the ANC gathered people in the fight for 
freedom. But even now, with Mandela fading out of South African politics, one 
important source of ANC’s authority is the charisma that stems from having been a 
liberation movement. 
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 5.4 Trust and loyalty to the ANC 
In the late nineties, more people in South Africa trusted the ANC government than did 
not, but the difference was not very big. A survey conducted by the HSRC shows that 
while about 45 percent of all South Africans answered that they had great trust or trust 
in the government, about 40 percent answered that they had little or no confidence in 
the government (Stene 2002: 93). Black South Africans trusted the government more 
(60 percent) while only 9 percent of the White South Africans said they trusted the 
government. Other surveys show that there has even been a decline in people’s trust in 
the ANC government the last decade. Whites and wealthy people’s trust has declined 
the most, but it has declined all over (Khosa 2005: 133-134). The poor trust the 
government more, but it is declining because of job losses and low delivery. Other 
surveys, like the Afrobarometer show the same tendencies (Mattes et al 2003). This 
has serious implications for the legitimacy of the government since legitimacy depends 
on how much people believe in it. If the people do not trust the government it may 
cause a decline in the legitimacy. 
 
Hagtvet describes loyalty as “a tie between the dominant and the subordinate” 
(Hagtvet 1978:247). It slows down the process of declining authority. If the electorate 
in South Africa is loyal to the ANC, it could result in the ANC staying in power longer 
than their authority would imply. In chapter 5.1 I have argued that people believe in 
the efficacy of the ANC, but that there is a lack of effectiveness. Charismatic authority 
needs to be proven through success. People do believe in the ANC’s ability to deliver, 
but the trust is declining, and there are signs of growing dissatisfaction with the 
delivery of the government. Therefore the authority of the ANC may be explained with 
loyalty in addition to people believing in their efficacy.  
 
Most of the population in South Africa feels a common and shared history with the 
organization ANC, and with its leaders. The struggle, which in retrospect is regarded 
as lead by the ANC, was the common struggle for all South Africans. Very few South 
Africans today would admit to supporting the apartheid regime, almost everybody 
seems to have supported the ANC and the fight for equal rights during the struggle. 
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 According to Robert Mattes at the University of Cape Town, the proportion of non-
partisan voters in South Africa is lower than for many countries in Europe. In 1994 as 
much as 89 percent of the voters answered that they felt especially close to one party 
when asked after the first democratic election of the country. But this number has 
since declined to less than 60 percent (Mattes 2005: 9). The proportion of partisan 
voters is somewhat higher among Blacks, whom are also the strongest supporters of 
the ANC. The ANC vote has been rather stable since 1994, but the opposition vote has 
fluctuated. Therefore it looks like ANC voters are most prone to identify with their 
party. Even if South Africans are less connected to one party all over, it looks like 
ANC voters may be more committed and loyal to their party. If this is true, the ANC 
supporters may vote for the ANC longer than they would otherwise.  
 
The leaders of the ANC are still the ones who fought in the struggle. Leading people in 
the ANC like Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa all fought in the 
struggle, either in South Africa or abroad. But in a few years, there will be a shift in 
the leadership. The old guard will become too old, and new people will take over. In 
time some of the loyalty with the ANC will probably disappear. 
 
For some people the loyalty to ANC will remain even though there are new leaders. In 
my interviews in Khayelitsha I asked if they had ever considered voting for another 
party than the ANC. I did not ask about what they would vote in the future, but 5 of 
the 10 interviewees said that they would always vote for the ANC, and they had never 
considered anything else (Khayelitsha 2005, no 1, 5, 6, 7, and 9 [interviews]). Even 
though they were dissatisfied with the government on several things, this did not 
influence their intended voting behavior. As long as ANC does not split, these people 
will probably continue to be loyal to the party. Only with a new generation that grows 
up in the democratic South Africa will this loyalty will be weakened.  
5.5 Conclusion 
People in South Africa feel that the ANC government has given them a lot. It has 
given them democracy and equal rights. On the other hand there is a lot the 
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 government does not deliver, most importantly to the poor and unemployed. The 
structures which keep people poor have not changed. There is a small elite who stays 
rich. But people still believe in the efficacy of the government. There are signs of a 
decline in people’s trust in the ANC, for instance through increasing mass protesting 
against low effectiveness. In time this may influence people’s belief in the ANC’s 
ability to solve problems too. There are already some signs of discontent with the 
efficacy, for instance visible through mass demonstrations when GEAR was 
introduced. 
 
Even with a lack of effectiveness the ANC gets a big majority of the votes in the 
elections. I have argued that this support stems from the charismatic authority that the 
ANC has got, and that this authority will remain for quite a while. People are also 
loyal to the ANC, and this conserves their charismatic authority and support. 
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 6. A SHORTAGE OF ALTERNATIVES 
The ANC got strong support in the 2004 national election. The opposition is weak and 
consisting of many and small parties. In this chapter I will discuss what mobilizes the 
South African electorate. How strongly does the electorate identify with the ANC? I 
will also look at the political space in South Africa, is it big enough for the opposition 
to create “substantive uncertainty”? And how does the Tripartite Alliance influence the 
political space? Finally I will discuss whether the ANC actively limits the potential 
political space in any way by changing the structures for power. 
6.1 Electoral behavior 
History decides much of the vote in South Africa. Especially black people identify 
with the ANC. The ANC was the organization they trusted to fight their fight against 
the oppressive regime of apartheid. The overwhelming support for the ANC may also 
be part of what Adam Habib calls “the honeymoon phenomenon”. Citizens in a new 
democracy vote for the liberators out of fear of reversion to authoritarianism (Habib 
2005: 47). That would imply that South Africans are rather voting for democracy than 
voting for the party when they are voting for the ANC. 
Mobilization 
South Africa is still a split country by race. Living in a system where race decided the 
extent of your rights and liberties has of course left footprints. A majority of blacks 
vote for the ANC, and whites for DA. Race decides what people vote in South Africa, 
but not if they vote (Faull 2005 [interview]). 
 
The voters themselves do not explain their vote with race. When asked about why they 
voted for the party they did in 1999, only 3.3 percent said they voted because of race 
identity (Rule 2004: 7). In 1999 most people voted out of a hope for a better life, for 
improvement and for more jobs. The majority of the electorate of the DP (now DA) 
voted because of the importance of having a good opposition (Ibid: 8-9). This consists 
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 with the election campaign of the DA, where they emphasize the need for a strong 
opposition. 
 
Apart from race, according to the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) 
the South African electorate is also divided by ideology (Faull 2005 [Interview]). 
There is a left - right cleavage in South African politics. Parties like the DA and IFP 
define themselves to the right of the scale. The IFP emphasizes traditional and family 
values like a classic conservative party in a Western democracy, and the DA practices 
a classic liberal policy. They emphasize the individual and its freedom and rights.  
 
All South Africans, and especially non-Whites, emphasize the economic components 
of democracy like employment, equal education and basic needs (Mattes et al. 2000: 
14).  
Turnout 
The turnout in South Africa’s three elections has been considered high, ranging 
between 76.7 percent and 89.3 percent (Election Synopsis 2004, no. 4: 30). The 
number of votes posted has declined, mainly because of stricter rules for voters’ 
registration (e-Politics 2005, edition 2: 2). In 1994 it was considered more important to 
have an election than to have a perfect election. There were abnormalities, accusations 
of voters casting more than one vote and parties registering dead people, but not on a 
scale that would undermine the legitimacy of the election.  
 
The total number of votes decreased with one fifth from 1994 to 1999, from about 19.5 
million to 15.6 million votes. It was a few hundred thousand further down in 2004 (e-
Politics, edition 2: 2). From 1994 to 2004 the opposition vote has declined with 36 
percent, from 7.3 million to 4.7 million votes. The ANC vote has declined with about 
10 percent from 1994 to 2004 (they gained votes from 1999 to 2004), from 12.2 
million to 10.9 million votes. IDASA has found that the ANC electorate is rather 
stable, while the opposition votes are shifting somewhat more (Ibid: 3). Altogether 




If the voters roll is limiting the number of votes severely; it may cause a legitimacy 
deficit based on Beetham’s dimension of expressed consent. In 1999 there was a 
retrenchment of the voters’ roll in South Africa; the main limitation was a new ID 
document which all voters had to possess. Also in 2004 the system of registration 
limited the number of people being able to vote9. Before the election about 23 million 
people intended to vote, but only about 20.7 million were registered in the voters roll 
(Friedman 2004:3). Of those 15.6 million people cast a valid ballot (Election synopsis 
no 4: 30). By comparing the number of votes cast to the number of the population 
above the age of 18, one gets an idea of what the turnout would be without any 
restrictions at all. From a population of 44.8 million people 15.6 million votes were 
cast (Census 2001 [homepage]). Looking at the age composition of the population 17.3 
million people were 17 years or younger in 2001. That leaves 27.5 million people of 
18 years or older10. The turnout calculated on the basis of this number is 57 percent. 
This is a very low turnout compared to other democracies. The equal calculation for 
Norway gives a turnout of 73 percent in 200111 (SSB 2005 [homepage]). Compared to 
other Sub-Saharan African countries for which the Afrobarometer has got information, 
South Africa did have a higher turnout in 1999, both as percentage of registered voters 
and as percentage of eligible voters (Bratton et al 2005: 145). Numbers are not yet 
available for the 2004 election. 
 
Another measure of limitation of the vote is the number of people registered in the 
voters’ roll compared to the population of 18 years or older. In South Africa 75 percent 
of the population of 18 years or older was in the voters’ roll for the 2004 election 
(Election synopsis no 4: 30). In Norway 97 percent of the population had the right to 
vote in 2005 (SSB 2005 [homepage]). These numbers show that there are limitations 
of the voters’ roll in South Africa which prevent 25 percent of the South Africans to 
vote. One reason for the difference between Norway and South Africa is the many 
                                                 
9 To register a person needs to: 1) apply for registration in person, 2) be a South African citizen and 3) possess and show a 
valid barcoded identity document or valid temporary identity certificate (IEC 2005 [homepage]). 
10 In Census 2001, age was divided in groups of 5 years. Therefore I do not have the exact number of South Africans eligible 
to vote, but have calculated it from the numbers from Census 2001. 
11 Number of valid ballots in Norway:  2 535 776, population of 18 years or older in 2001 calculated from the same numbers 
as for South Africa: 3 458 033. 
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 non-South African citizens who live in South Africa. They do not have the right to 
vote. But another reason is probably that you actively have to register to vote in South 
Africa, while in Norway you get registered automatically. This comparison shows that 
the turnout for South Africa is not as high as it is sometimes regarded as.  
Political tolerance 
Political tolerance in a democracy is to accept political opponents in the competition 
for governmental power. Numbers from IDASA from the late nineties in a survey 
called “Opinion ’99” show that about a quarter of all South Africans would participate 
in actions to prevent their political opponents in competing for political power12 (Stene 
2002: 99). Black South Africans are more prone to such intolerable behavior than 
White South Africans. My interviewee number 3 in Khayelitsha said she would like to 
participate actively in the ANC, but she did not because she was afraid of reactions 
from her community. Even though they were all voting for the ANC, she was afraid 
that if you got any privileges from engaging in the ANC, people would be jealous and 
therefore turn to violence. Therefore she rather engaged in community work than 
politics. This is an example of political intolerance not only preventing political 
opponents, but also preventing political engagement all over. 
 
When I asked former political journalist Barry Streek and Jonathan Faull at IDASA 
about political tolerance, they both understood it as political violence. They both said 
that there is less political violence than one could have feared in a divided society like 
the South African (2005 [interviews]). There has been little violence, and people of all 
races participate through the democratic channels. There are several incidents of 
political violence every year, but all over levels of political violence is low. After the 
transition many Whites feared that they would not be able to stay in South Africa, that 
they would be forced to move, but this has been refuted. 
                                                 
12 Intolerable behavior is to prevent your political opponents from either living in your community, giving political speeches, 
opening a campaigning office in your community, election campaigning in your community or visiting people in your 
community to ask for political support. 
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 6.2 The strong ANC 
The people I spoke to in Khayelitsha, talked about the history and about ANC giving 
them freedom when I asked the about the ANC. To the people I spoke to, the ANC as 
a liberation movement still is very present. Some of them looked at me with surprise 
when I asked if they had considered voting for anything else than the ANC. But there 
are also other aspects that make the ANC able to mobilize more than two thirds of the 
votes in South Africa today.  
 
ANC’s history of being a liberation movement makes it special as a party. As 
described above, it has delivered very much to the people in South Africa when it 
comes to freedom and rights and democracy. And people still believe that the ANC 
can make their lives better. ANC has been the party that introduced democracy, and 
people may regard it as a guarantee for democracy as well. The biggest opposition 
party, the DA, mainly mobilizes white people and they use the racial differences in 
their competition for votes. This may suggest a similarity to the National Party (NP) 
which was responsible for the apartheid system. The strong connection between the 
ANC and democracy and a possible connection between the DA and the NP may result 
in a strong vote for the ANC out of fear of the return of authoritarianism. It is part of 
what Adam Habib characterizes as the “honeymoon phenomenon” (Habib 2005: 47). 
 
Some will argue that the strong support for the ANC is explained by ethnicity. Most 
Blacks do vote for the ANC. In central Khayelitsha the ANC vote is about 90-95 
percent. Khayelitsha is in the province of Western Cape where the ANC has the lowest 
vote of the nine provinces (46.3 percent). The strong ANC vote among Blacks may 
also be caused by black people feeling that they have no alternative to vote for. The 
DA is a party for white people. And except for the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal, the other 
opposition parties are very small. One man I spoke to in Khayelitsha said that a vote 
for the opposition would be a waste of vote (Khayelitsha 2005 no 10 [interview]).  
Party identification 
Party identification with the ANC was strong, but has been declining. In 1994 75 
percent of the black voters said that they identified with the ANC in the post-election 
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 survey13 (Mattes 2005: 10). In 2003 the same number was 55 percent; the party 
identification among Blacks is thus declining. In the same time period, the ANC vote 
has been stable while the opposition vote has been shifting around (e-Politics 2005, 
edition 2: 3). The reason for an increasing ANC-share of the votes in the national 
elections is a decline in the opposition vote.  
 
When the party identification is declining but people still vote for the ANC, this may 
be because of a lack of alternatives. If there was a viable opposition to vote for, people 
might have done so. On the other hand the opposition vote is probably small because 
of the same reason: the ANC taking up too much of the political space, so there is not 
much left to the opposition. And if party identity is strong for the people voting for the 
ANC, it may limit the political space even more. A loyal ANC constituency may be 
inclined to vote for the ANC even if it does not consider their interests.  
Iron law of oligarchy 
How strong is the ANC holding on to the power it has got? The main opposition party, 
the DA, is accusing the ANC of changing the structures of governance so that they get 
increasingly strong. They claim that the ANC are “integrating the state in the 
organization” (Coetzee 2005 [interview]).  
 
Mbeki is certainly regarded as having a strict party discipline. Barry Streek describes 
Mbeki as a President with an authoritarian style; he is demanding great control over 
the party (2005 [interview]). Mbeki has extended his powers to decide appointments, 
for instance by now appointing the political leaders in the provinces, the Premiers 
(Ehrenreich 2005 [interview]). The economic strategy of GEAR was also adopted in a 
less democratic way than its predecessor, the RDP. GEAR was adopted by the 
Government rather than by the members of the ANC, and without the participation of 
the Tripartite Alliance. Mbeki is accused of having brought with him the closed culture 
of the exiles in the government (Gumede 2005: 133-134). This involves a strict 
discipline and decisions made by the central leadership without the democratic 
involvement of the members, a centralizing of power. In an analysis of democratic 
                                                 
13 Black people make out 80 percent of the population (Census 2001 [homepage]) 
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 consolidation in Africa on the basis of the Afrobarometer 2001, South Africa does not 
get a high score compared to other Sub-Saharan countries (Bratton et al 2005: 325-
326). An important explanation for this is that the ANC government is “concentrating 
power in executive hands” (Ibid: 326).  
 
Inside the ANC the question is if one finds the “legitimate opposition” that Lipset 
describes as preventing the leaders from clinging on to their power like oligarchs. Such 
an opposition may occur after an organization is exposed to a crisis. Fractions develop, 
which in time turn into a legitimate opposition. The ANC was exposed to a major 
change in the beginning of the nineties, becoming a political party and winning the 
first democratic election. From being an illegal organization with branches all over the 
world as well as in prisons and in secrecy in South Africa, it was unbanned and the 
different parts were brought together. Different cultures dominated the organization. 
The ANC claims that the conflict between the different cultures has been dealt with 
(Sizane 2005 [interview]); by others the culture of the exiles is regarded as having won 
with Thabo Mbeki as ANC president (Gumede 2005: 137). The ANC claims that there 
is a lot of debate and opposition inside the party today. 
 
In the government structure, the Alliance can be considered to be an opposition. The 
alliance partners are represented in the government and also in ANC’s democratic 
institutions, like the congress every fifth year. Both COSATU and SACP are trying to 
pull the ANC to the left (Ehrenreich 2005 and Magaxa 2005 [interviews]). Even 
though they have more than two-thirds of the members in Parliament, the ANC 
government must consider the interest of their alliance partners. SACP and COSATU 
complain that they are not heard in the Alliance, only when there is an election around 
the corner, but the ANC is very aware of the Alliance and its support. The Alliance is 
often mentioned both by the ANC and in the media. When the economic strategy RDP 
was adopted in 1994, it was a result of a negotiation inside the Tripartite Alliance. 




 COSATU is opposing to the ANC through demonstrations and strikes and showing 
ANC that they have power through the masses they are able to mobilize. There have 
been several mass demonstrations and strikes against the economic policy of the 
government. There were for instance several strikes against GEAR in the late 90’s. 
The last half of 2005, COSATU has promised monthly strikes demanding the 
government to do more about the unemployment in South Africa (Mail and Guardian 
June 24th). This opposition is too strong to be ignored by the Government. Even 
though the centralized culture of Mbeki is regarded as dominating the ANC now, there 
is a chance that this will change because of strong fractions opposing to this culture.  
 
Personal interests, like keeping a job, are also a reason for an organization turning into 
an oligarchy (Lipset 1962: 17-18). In a country with a high unemployment rate like 
South Africa this is of interest. Fear of job losses may result in the ANC leadership 
making an effort to stay in power. The alternative to be in government may well be to 
be unemployed. This applies to the ANC members is government, and to the people 
employed in the government through COSATU and the SACP.  
 
As for opposition from other organizations, the ANC government does accept all 
political rights and freedoms as they are expressed in the UN Declaration of Civil and 
Political rights, and in the South African Constitution. But it has struck hard down on 
illegal protesting. The government claims that during the apartheid regime it was 
legitimate with illegal protests, but a legitimate state requires legitimate protests, 
which is legal protesting (Ballard 2005: 89). Whether this is a limitation to political 
opposition or not depends on the access to protest legally. If this is narrow, there is 
need for illegal protesting as well to express opposition. According to Richard Ballard 
at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, the social movements have been denied the right 
to protest marches and have been arrested when they have gone through with it on 
several occasions (Ibid). On the other hand there is a strong voice from the civil 
society in South Africa, the partners of the Tripartite Alliance being leading forces. 
Freedom House also rates South Africa as free and respecting the human rights, and 
compliments a “lively protest scene” (Freedom House 2004 [homepage]). 
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 6.3 The Weak Opposition 
A functioning democracy needs what Adam Habib calls “substantive uncertainty” 
(Habib 2005: 47). This implies that there has to be real competition for governmental 
power. The opposition in South Africa is weak. There are many opposition parties, but 
none of them get any significant share of the votes. The DA claims it is a strong 
opposition party even though it doesn’t get a great percentage of the vote (Coetzee 
2005 [interview]), but when it comes to seats in the Parliament, it is the percentage 
that counts. What is more – the ANC has got more than two thirds of the seats, and this 
makes them able to make any decision they want, even changing the Constitution.  
Party opposition 
There are a range of opposition parties in South Africa, and in general they are all very 
small. The DA is the biggest one, getting 12 percent of the votes in 2004 (IEC 2005 
[homepage]). Some of them are strong in one province, but do not get many votes 
when competing on a national level for seats in Parliament. For instance the Inkhata 
Freedom Party (IFP) got 35 percent of the votes in KwaZulu-Natal in 2004, but it only 
got 7 percent of the votes on a national level. In the Western Cape, where I did my 
field work, the ANC is rather weak compared to the rest of the country, and the DA is 
very strong. The ANC got 46 percent of the votes, while DA got 27 percent. One 
radical left opposition party also did rather well in the Western Cape, the Independent 
Democrats, which got 8 percent of the votes, but on a national level they only got a 
mere 1.7 percent. This may indicate that some opposition parties have a potential, but 
that they do not have the resources to fight for votes in all provinces.  
 
The share of the votes for the opposition parties in the different provinces is also 
explained by race. The Western Cape is the only province in South Africa where the 
majority is not black. More than 50 percent of the people in the Western Cape are 
coloreds, a little more than 25 percent are black, and a little less than 20 percent are 
white (Census 2001 [homepage]). The DA explains their strong position with this 
racial composition (Zille 2005 [interview]). The reason for IFP being so strong in 
KwaZulu-Natal is that more than 80 percent of the population is Zulu (Census 2001 
[homepage]). But it also shows that many people do not vote according to race, since 
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 the IFP got 35 percent of the votes in KwaZulu-Natal, less than half of the Zulu 
population voted for them. Still, racial voting is a problem for the South African 
democracy. The electorate does not explain their vote with racial identity, but at least 
in some provinces like KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape parties do mobilize a big 
share of the electorate according to race. Probably this tendency will be weakened in 
the future. The IFP is turning to family and tradition values and away from the “Zulu 
pride”, and the DA focuses on getting black support. But it may well be that the 
problem of racial voting will not disappear until the parties change. Today the ANC is 
dominating, especially among Blacks who make out 80 percent of the population. A 
split in the ANC would maybe lead the South African democracy towards substantive 
uncertainty, and a stronger opposition. As long as the ANC is so strong, and the 
opposition is only strong in some provinces, the Parliamentary opposition will 
probably remain weak. 
 
Because of the opposition being stronger on the provincial level, the issues they 
promote during the election campaigns also appeal to a local electorate. The national 
election campaign is not very focused. The opposition parties on a national level all 
claim that they need your vote because the ANC is too strong, and one needs an 
alternative. The only party which has done this successfully is the DA. But still, they 
appeal mostly to white voters, and use the fact that they are used to the Westminster 
system where there is one ruling party and one strong opposition party. 
 
There is not much room for party opposition, but except for the DA, the existing 
parties do not use the little room there is well either. It is too fragmented, and split 
according to provinces, and therefore not as strong as they could have been, had they 
been more united on a national level.  
Issue-based Opposition, “Low politics” 
During the recent years several social movements have sprung out in South Africa. 
Some of them have been very successful. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has 
gathered many people in the fight for the rights of HIV/ Aids positive people in South 
Africa. They have managed to influence the Government, and have pushed them to 
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 give medicine to people with HIV and Aids. Also the Anti-privatization Forum and the 
Landless People’s movement have had successes and become political actors whom 
the government has to consider in the South African society. The strongest opposition 
on social issues is the Congress of trade unions, COSATU. Even though in alliance 
with the ANC, COSATU and the labor unions are frequently demonstrating against the 
government. They are demanding job creation and better conditions for the poor in 
South Africa. Local COSATU affiliated unions demonstrate against low government 
delivery. 
 
The growth of social movements the last years may be because the political space for 
issue-based opposition is bigger than the space for party opposition. Some voters 
consider it to be a waste of vote to vote for the opposition. If ANC is the only viable 
alternative to vote for, the only way of influencing government policy is to engage in a 
movement. People may consider this to have more effect than voting for the opposition 
in South Africa (Faull 2005 [interview]). The ANC has got strong support in the 
electorate, but at the same time there is a lot of criticism, especially on government 
delivery to the poor and how they have dealt with the problem of HIV and Aids. This 
makes room for issue-based opposition. People do not want the ANC out of 
government, but they want to influence their policy on specific issues. It takes less 
political space to mobilize for an issue like poverty reduction than it takes to compete 
for governmental power.  
 
The issue-based opposition focuses on how politics is executed rather than on the 
power structures, for instance how a government is elected (Beetham 1991:156). This 
kind of opposition does not challenge the power of the dominant like party opposition 
does in an election. Still, if a substantive part of the South African electorate joins 
social movements and expresses their discontent with the government, it will result in 
a delegitimation of their authority. This has happened in some Latin American 
countries, for instance in Argentine where governments were replaced repeatedly in a 
short period of time in the beginning of this decade because of mass demonstrations. 
This is not the situation in South Africa, but it shows the importance for the 
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 government of taking these movements and protests seriously, especially when the 
party opposition is as weak as it is in South Africa. 
 
COSATU is campaigning on a broad set of issues. They arrange mass demonstrations 
and strikes with focus on different socioeconomic issues. Monthly strikes in the last 
half of 2005 are demanding that the government should do more to create jobs. During 
the summer of 2005 protests have turned violent several places in South Africa (The 
Star August 9th 2005). The unions are gathering people with an increasing 
dissatisfaction with the ANC government. It seems like the frustration is growing even 
though it doesn’t show in elections. This opposition is too strong to be ignored. 
 
COSATU is not only protesting on different issues, they are also forming alliances 
with like-minded movements. They are part of the “People’s Budget Campaign” in 
company with the South African Non-Governmental Coalition and South African 
Council of Churches. The campaign works out an alternative to the public budget 
created by the government (People’s Budget 2005). In August 2005 COSATU 
launched a new coalition working for economic reforms favoring the poor, 
representing more than 70 organizations from the labor, the church, NGOs and others 
(SAPA August 23rd 2005).  
 
COSATU is part of the Tripartite Alliance with the ANC in Government, but is also 
creating other coalitions when they regard it as strategic (Mail and Guardian August 
12th 2005). It is not challenging the power of the ANC, it is inviting them to join the 
other alliances, but they are creating power structures outside the Tripartite Alliance. 
COSATU is thus not only operating with “low” politics, but also “high” politics.  
 
A possible way of increasing political space is the development of new socioeconomic 
classes, or restructuring of socioeconomic classes (Linz 1980:167). The middle class is 
growing in South Africa, and it is mainly the middle class which engages in the social 
movements (Faull 2005 [interview]). No party in South Africa has been able to 
mobilize the middle class. If the opposition could mobilize them, it would be stronger.  
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The campaigns and alliances of COSATU, the growing middle class and the creation 
of a number of social movements are all signs of an increasing opposition to the ANC, 
and a more effective use of the political space which is available in South Africa. If the 
ANC takes the strong support they get for granted and do not listen to the protests, 
there is a chance of a decline in their legitimacy. 
6.4 The Tripartite Alliance 
The ANC is trying to be a “broad church for all”. It has succeeded in mobilizing a 
broad spectrum of people. The Tripartite Alliance causes the ANC to cover even more 
of the political spectrum than it would have done otherwise.  
 
Both COSATU and the SACP are left of the ANC on the political scale. The SACP 
calls upon their electorate to vote for the ANC. This limits the political space to the 
left. If the SACP was competing in elections, IDASA expects them to have got about 
15-17 percent of the votes. So what would have been the largest opposition electorate 
is now voting for the party in position. The Alliance makes the ANC stronger, and it 
pushes the opposition in Parliament to the right since the ANC covers the opposition 
parties to the left. In other words, the ANC covers more of the political space to the 
left than to the right. This may be a reason for the biggest opposition party being the 
conservative-liberal DA. 
 
The Tripartite Alliance is in the interest of the SACP because it gives influence in the 
Government. It may be regarded as limiting the political space by preventing 
opposition to the left. This reduces the substantive uncertainty in the South African 
democracy. COSATU is also given influence with the Alliance. There is a chance that 
COSATU would have opposed more to the government if it was not in alliance with 
the ANC. The Alliance makes the biggest actors on the left side in South African 
politics compete together and cooperate rather than being in opposition to each other. 
The political environment in South Africa has been one of cooperating and alliances 
ever since the ANC became influential. This was how it got the apartheid government 
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 to step down, and how ANC managed to agree upon a new democratic government 
after the fall of apartheid (The Government of National Unity). 
 
A culture of cooperating and negotiating may be a constructive and good one, but it 
may also give some actors too much power. In a democracy like the South African 
with many different interests, substantive uncertainty is a guarantee for all interests to 
be considered (Habib 2005: 47). An alliance between the biggest actors to the left in 
South African politics may reduce the substantive uncertainty. 
6.5 Khayelitsha 
In Khayelitsha 90-95 percent of the registered voters vote for the ANC14 (IEC and 
Municipal Demarcation Board 2005 [homepages], see appendix 3). All ten people I 
interviewed in Khayelitsha supported the ANC, they had voted for them in every 
election where they had the opportunity to do so15, and they had never considered 
voting for anything else. Almost everybody they knew also voted for the ANC, one 
knew someone who voted for the UDM (Khayelitsha 2005, no 7 [interviews]) and two 
knew someone who voted for PAC (no 8 and 10). Interviewee no 10 said this was a 
“waste of a vote”; PAC wouldn’t get any power anyway.  
 
When I asked people in Khayelitsha about what motivated them to vote for the ANC, 
most of the answers were about freedom, and about what the ANC has been to them 
during the struggle. Three mentioned Mandela, even if he is out of politics now (no 1, 
6 and 8). “I’ve heard of ANC ever since school. Especially Mandela, he is my hero” 
(no 1). Many of the answers as to why people vote for the ANC go back in time in 
explaining it. The ANC have given people freedom and equality, and so they vote for 
the ANC. Some did mention material improvements they had got from the ANC, like 
housing and electricity. But none of them said anything about the ANC having a better 
policy than other parties, or being able to do a better job than others.  
                                                 
14 I have looked at 48 polling stations in central Khayelitsha which account for 109 626 votes all together. Some polling 
stations were just above 95 percent and some were just below 90 percent. Only in one of the 48 districts the ANC got just 
over 60 percent (Voting district 97142070: WO and NCO Club). 
15 No. 2 had not voted in 1994 because she was too young and no 9 had never voted because she was only old enough in 2004 
but then she didn’t get her ID in time. 
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None of the people I spoke to were active in the ANC. One had been so in his youth 
(no. 8). Some of them were active in community work, in the church (no 3), in the 
street committee (no 7), and some were employed in social work (no 2 without 
payment and 1, 6 and 8 with a salary). As mentioned before, interviewee no 3 even 
wished to participate in the ANC actively, but did not out of fear of reactions from her 
community.   
 
The option of voting for anything else than the ANC seemed very distant for the 
people I interviewed in Khayelitsha. They trust the ANC’s ability to make a change, 
and they are loyal to their liberators. But one also expressed that there is no alternative 
to vote for, the ANC is too strong.  
6.6 Conclusion 
If one is to follow Huntington’s strict requirement for democratic consolidation that a 
post-transition government has lost elections twice and given up power peacefully, 
South Africa has a long way to go. There is no sign of the ANC losing an election yet. 
The ANC is too strong, and the opposition too weak. 
 
The ANC covers a lot of the political space in South Africa today. The reason for this 
is both a strong ANC and a weak opposition. The ANC vote has been stable since 
1994 and there are no signs of this changing after the 2004 election. One problem may 
be the lack of an alternative opposition to vote for. The ANC is covering a lot of the 
political spectrum, especially to the left because of the Tripartite Alliance. The rest of 
the opposition is fragmented, and is no threat to the governmental power of the ANC. 
Some of the people I spoke to in Khayelitsha stated that they will vote for the ANC the 
rest of their lives. From this example it seems like it will take a new generation of 
voters before people will vote for something else. But surveys show that party 
identification is not as strong in South Africa as it is in other countries, both Western 
and African. And the party identification is declining. This may be a sign of that South 
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 Africans are likely to vote for another party if they see it as a real alternative to 
governmental power.  
 
The best chance of increasing the political space in South Africa is a split in the ANC, 
or a break-up of the Tripartite Alliance. Both scenarios could lead to a strong 
opposition party to the left of the ANC. This could change the political scene in South 
Africa, and probably increase the political space for opposition.  
 
Mbeki and the government are accused of centralizing state power. But there are 
strong voices opposing to government policy, especially from COSATU. The litmus 
test of how strongly the ANC is holding on to power will be the next presidential 
election, in 2009. At that point Mbeki has been President for two terms, and a new 
President is to be elected. Then we will se how influential Mbeki will be in the 
process. 
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 7. LEGITIMATE? 
The research question for this thesis is about the legitimacy of the ANC government 
and its sources. In this chapter I will sum up the discussions from chapter 5 and 6 
within the framework of David Beetham’s theoretical dimensions of legitimacy.  
 
The authority of the ANC is strong, but it is moving away from Nelson Mandela and 
the liberation movement. The authority may remain; its source may be the changing 
factor. This may be part of what Max Weber calls “Routinization of charismatic 
authority”.  
 
Two other factors are crucial for the legitimacy of the ANC Government. The first is 
the delivery of the government, and the other is real competition for power. I will pick 
up these discussions from the two previous chapters. 
7.1 Routinization of charismatic authority 
As shown in chapter 5 one of the main sources of the ANC’s authority today is 
charisma. This charisma will probably fade, as the liberation struggle is growing more 
distant. The source of authority of a government may change without the government 
loosing their authority. In South Africa the source of authority shows signs of turning 
from charismatic to legal-rational. This is what Weber calls the “routinization of 
charisma”. Once the source of the charisma (liberation struggle individualized through 
Nelson Mandela) is fading, the source of authority will be rationalized. Part of the 
routinization is less focus on person and more on position, for instance with Thabo 
Mbeki as the President of South Africa and not Nelson Mandela. Even if the 
charismatic authority of the ANC is fading, their power does not necessarily disappear, 
it changes (Weber 1971: 101). One source of authority is of course the strong support 
they get in the elections. I discuss this in chapter 7.3.  
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 The use of the liberation symbols in demonstrations against the ANC as described in 
chapter 5 shows that the ANC and the ideology of freedom are separating from each 
other. This is part of a routinization of charisma. ANC’s charismatic authority builds 
on the ideology of freedom and liberation. The charismatic authority is weakened 
when this ideological source is weakened.  
 
Thabo Mbeki, from 1999 both ANC leader and President of South Africa, does not 
have the same charismatic authority as Nelson Mandela. He was in exile during the 
struggle. He is from a family of ANC activists; his father Govan Mbeki was 
imprisoned on Robben Island with Mandela. Thabo Mbeki was part of the struggle, 
gaining support for the ANC in exile and he was an important actor in the negotiations 
which lead to democracy. The struggle is still important for the authority of the ANC 
and its leaders. Mbeki does have some authority because of participating in the 
struggle, but he does not have the personal qualifications which give him charismatic 
authority. He is too distanced from the people. His style is the one of a British 
intellectual, smoking a pipe, wearing a suit; and his focus is on governing rather than 
on showing that he is “one of the people” (Gumede 2005: 58). The percentage of 
South Africans answering that they trusted the President a lot declined from 73 percent 
in 1998 to 41 percent in 2000, and has continued to decline (Afrobarometer, Mattes 
2003: 4). At the same time Mbeki succeeded Mandela as President. The disappearance 
of the charismatic President Mandela may be a reason for this decline. 
 
Thabo Mbeki has managed to get economic growth in South Africa. He has structured 
the fiscal policy and business believes in him. He has thus done a lot for business 
interests in South Africa. But he is not a man of the people, and a hero like Mandela 
was. The focus is turning away from person and to position, and this may involve a 
change in source of authority from charismatic to legal-rational. 
 
During the first ten years of democracy, the President of the ANC has also been 
President of South Africa. The President is elected by the Parliament (Constitution 
1996, section 86 (1)), and with the ANC having more than 50 percent of the members, 
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 the ANC makes the decision. This year the ANC has opened up for the possibility of 
separating the two; saying that the next President of South Africa will not necessarily 
be the ANC President (Cape Times March 15th 2005). The reason for this may be 
Mbeki holding on to power. There is no limit as to how long he can stay President of 
the ANC, but he can only be head of state two terms, ending in 2009. It may also be 
fear of who will be elected next president of the ANC. The result of a separation of the 
head of state and ANC president will contribute to a routinization of the charismatic 
authority of the ANC. Separating the two positions will lead the focus away from one 
person. It would also clarify the division between the decision making process of the 
party ANC and of the government. 
 
There may be a decline in ANC’s charismatic authority because of the economic 
policy turning in a neo-liberalist direction. When asked about delivery of the ANC 
Government, the political left – including the Tripartite Alliance partners – criticize 
the ANC for having abandoned the Freedom Charter (People’s Budget 2005:1). The 
Freedom Charter was adopted in 1955 in a very different society than South Africa is 
today. But the Freedom Charter in South Africa has a very special status, it is not only 
a policy document, but it is a written manifest over the struggle against apartheid. The 
policy in the Freedom Charter is the one that gave South Africans the vision of a new 
regime to come after apartheid. So for the ANC to abandon the policies in the Freedom 
Charter is to break the promises of a better life for many South Africans. Ben Sizane in 
the ANC argues that the ANC is only adapting to contemporary South Africa when 
they are deviating from the Freedom Charter (Sizane 2005 [interview]). The reason for 
this upsetting people is that the Freedom Charter represents the struggle and the 
promises of liberation, which is the same ideology that is the bases for the strong 
charismatic authority of the ANC. Abandoning the Freedom Charter may be regarded 
as one way of breaking down some of ANC’s authority.  
 
For South Africa this routinization of charismatic authority is an important process in 
the consolidation of democracy. As long as people see the ANC as liberators and their 
loyalty makes them vote for the ANC because of the changes they have made in the 
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 past (giving them democracy), the democratic guarantees to prevent the misuse of 
power are not working. With Mandela leaving politics, there is less focus on person 
and more on position in South Africa. But the charismatic authority of the ANC will 
probably remain strong longer both because of the ANC as an organization has also 
got charismatic authority, and because of loyalty to the ANC. Even when Mandela is 
out of the Government and the liberation struggle is growing more distant, people are 
loyal to the liberation movement ANC. This slows down the process of routinization 
of the charisma. If the party would split and people had to consider other alternatives 
to vote for than the ANC of today, the charismatic authority would be redefined. 
7.2 Government delivery 
The constitution, and thereby the governmental system in a country must build on 
some kind of authoritative source. According to David Beetham the rules need to be 
justified through some shared beliefs to be considered legitimate. One precondition is 
that people accept subordination to the national government, that they feel part of the 
same nation state. In South Africa it is a problem for nation building that the 
socioeconomic division of the country is so big. If the government does not manage to 
change this, it will prevent a nation building and it may possibly cause a legitimacy 
deficit because of the government not considering the general interest of the citizens 
by leaving half of the population in poverty. South Africans do feel South African 
first, despite their racial groups (Khosa 2005: 145), but both culture and history are 
dividing them. The socioeconomic division could reinforce these cleavages.  
 
People in South Africa do believe in the ANC Government’s ability to solve the 
problems of the country. The ANC did give them democracy, so people trust that they 
can deliver other things too. But there are major cleavages and inequalities in South 
Africa today based on class and race, and these are addressed by more and more 
people, the labor unisons through COSATU being especially visible in protesting. 
 
A part of Beetham’s dimension of rule-justification, is that a government must have a 
concern for the general interest. People will not accept subordinance to a government 
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 which does not consider their interests in any way. South Africa is divided 
economically. Class, at least the lower ones, is still decided by race. The economic 
elite has become more or less colorblind, but the poor are still black. This concern is 
always pronounced in public policies, but not much is changing. There is little sign of 
people moving out of the poorer classes. And as discussed in chapter 2, this has much 
to do with the many unskilled people in South Africa without a job. They have few 
chances of getting a job, and therefore small chances of improving their 
socioeconomic status. They will thus stay poor, and stay in the townships and rural 
areas. If nothing changes in this regard, the government may risk a legitimacy deficit. 
 
Beetham describes a “manifest failure of performance” as a cause of legitimacy 
deficit. When half of the people in South Africa are poor, can one claim that the 
government has delivered? There are many things the government has not yet 
delivered; equality and jobs being the two biggest problems. But as Afrobarometer 
data and the example of the poor people I talked to in Khayelitsha shows, people still 
believe in the government’s efficacy. They did get freedom and equal rights from the 
ANC, and they believe that the ANC can solve their problems of today too. Even 
though there is a long way to go, because of people’s belief in the ANC, the 
government does not show a “manifest failure of performance” yet. 
 
Another aspect of concern for the general interest, which I have not discussed until 
now, is corruption. If the politicians in power are only looking after their own 
interests, there may be a legitimacy deficit (Beetham 1991: 142). South Africa does 
have problems with corruption and also politicians misusing their positions to their 
own, their relatives’ or friends’ benefit. The case of Jacob Zuma is just one example of 
corruption in the leadership of the ANC. Zuma was deputy president in the 
government until he was charged with corruption in July 2005, he has not yet been on 
trial (October 2005). The government is eager to show that they are trying to do 
something about corruption. The government’s special investigating unit, “the 
Scorpions”, has got great credibility. They are investigating Jacob Zuma, a sign that 
they do not avoid investigating ANC leaders. Jacob Zuma has many and powerful 
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 supporters like COSATU and SACP and many in the ANC too (Mail and Guardian, 
June 30th 2005). They do not believe the accusations against him. If Zuma continues to 
be elected as a leader in the ANC if he gets sentenced for corruption, the ANC may 
lose legitimacy in many people’s eyes.  
 
Several of the people I spoke to in Khayelitsha mentioned corruption or politicians 
being out for their own gain as a problem when asked what they thought of politicians 
(Khayelitsha 2005, no 1, 6 and 7 [interviews]). The Afrobarometer survey shows that 
more than 20 percent of the South African population think that the elected leaders of 
the country are corrupt (local and national), and almost 30 percent think that 
government officials are corrupt (Mattes 2003: 10).  This may be a problem for the 
legitimacy of the ANC. If people do not trust that the politicians are promoting their 
interests, then they may withdraw their support for the democratic system. But the 
percentage of the population believing that the Members of Parliament are corrupt has 
declined from more than 40 percent in the late nineties to just above 20 percent in 
2002 (Afrobarometer, Mattes 2003: 10). This may be a sign that the government is 
successful in their fight against corruption. 
 
Another side of the general interest is the principle of differentiation between the 
dominant and the subordinate in South Africa. The dominant, defined as both the 
government and the economic elite, are socioeconomic much better of than the 
majority of the population. One way of explaining this differentiation is that they have 
the skills to do the job, and therefore deserve to be better of. The problem with this 
explanation in South Africa is that the majority of the people have never had the 
chance to get these skills. With the unemployment rate being about 40 percent, even 
with skills people may not have a chance to get a job. There is a major economic 
difference between the employed and the unemployed. People need to have the same 
chances; otherwise the principle of differentiation between the dominant and 
subordinate will become more and more illegitimate. There is an increasing demand 
through mass demonstrations and protests that the government must create more jobs. 
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 If demands continue to grow and things do not change, the government may risk a 
legitimacy deficit.  
 
The difference between the employed and unemployed people in South Africa is also a 
question of race. The unemployment is much higher for Blacks than for Whites 
(Tørres 2001: 8). The government has introduced affirmative action to change the 
white dominance in most sectors. This implies that there is a preference for black 
people when someone is employed16 (Department of Labour 2005 [homepage]). This 
causes frustration, especially among Whites, because they do not see skin color as a 
legitimate principle of differentiation when others have got the skills for the job. 
7.3 A real choice of government 
The other dimension of legitimacy I discuss is expressed consent. Expressed consent 
builds on the philosophical thought of there being a social contract for all citizens of a 
state, in which they accept the legitimate power of the government. For the citizens of 
a country to be able to express their consent with a government through an election, 
there must be a real choice of viable alternatives. In South Africa there is limited 
political space, the ANC mobilizes most of it. Since the ANC is so strong, it is likely 
that some people think it is a waste of vote to vote for something else than the ANC, 
like my interviewee no 10 (Khayelitsha 2005 [interviews]). 
 
The ANC is in alliance with the major actors to the left, this limits the political space. 
Both inside and outside the ANC there is debate about a break-out by the leftists in the 
party, and there is also debate about a break in the Tripartite Alliance. A break either 
in the ANC or of the Tripartite Alliance could give South Africa a strong party to the 
left of the ANC, and it could open up the political space.  
 
On the other hand the elections strengthen the legitimacy of the ANC Government. 
The ANC getting 70 percent of the votes does support the legitimacy of the 
Government. But there are limitations to the voters’ roll, and this could be a potential 
                                                 
16 And other disadvantaged groups like women and people with disabilities 
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 problem for the legitimacy of the government. But South Africans express their 
consent in other ways too. In 2004 there was a big celebration of the 10 years of 
democracy. ANC was central in the celebration; it was an ANC celebration as well. 
Many people were participating in the celebrations, and this was one way of 
expressing consent with both the “new South Africa” and with the ANC government 
because of the ANC being so present in the celebrations.  
 
A way of expressing consent on an institutional level is negotiations. The negotiating 
parts accept the other part’s authority to negotiate (Beetham 1991:93). The ANC is 
governing South Africa with the partners of Tripartite Alliance. The members of 
COSATU and the SACP show their support for the alliance through collecting votes 
for the ANC. The alliance legitimizes the strong ANC and by joining the alliance the 
partners agree to the ANC being so strong in South Africa. They consider it to be 
better with a strong ANC than any alternative, for instance being in opposition to the 
ANC, or that the opposition to the right should be stronger compared to the ANC.  
 
There is an increasing opposition in South Africa through issue-based movements. 
They do not focus as much on changing the power structures as on “low politics”. But 
as it gets bigger, it will force the ANC to consider the criticism. The fact that the mass 
demonstrations arranged by the movements are becoming more violent is a sign of 
growing frustration with the Government. If the government does not do anything 
about the demands they risk a legitimacy deficit.  
7.4 Conclusion 
I began this thesis by telling of an Ethiopian woman who voted for the governing party 
because it was the party with power. With that as a background I wished to explore the 
legitimacy of the ANC government in South Africa. Legitimacy is essential to the 
process of democratic consolidation. Legitimacy is about people’s beliefs in the 




 The ANC has got many characteristics which fit with Weber’s concept of charismatic 
authority. Their past as a liberation movement and the leader Nelson Mandela are 
probably the most significant ones. I have argued that even though there is a lot the 
ANC does not deliver, this charismatic authority makes people believe in their 
efficacy, their ability to solve the problems of the country. I have argued that a 
routinization of the charismatic authority is crucial for the democracy in South Africa. 
Otherwise we will see a continuation of what Adam Habib calls the “honeymoon 
phenomenon”, the ruling party of a young democracy knows that it will get strong 
support anyway, and so it fulfills the interests of the global business rather than the 
interests of the people in the country. This way there will be no change in the 
economic distribution in South Africa. 
 
The other main challenge for the legitimacy of the ANC government is the limited 
political space in the country. The ANC got 70 percent of the votes in the last election, 
which leaves little room for opposition. With the Tripartite Alliance the ANC is 
covering the left side of the political spectrum. The rest of the opposition is 
fragmented and not a real threat to the power of the ANC. The opposition is not using 
the available political space effectively. But there is a growing issue-based opposition 
in South Africa through social movements. The labor movements, COSATU being the 
leading force, are increasingly arranging mass demonstrations and strikes. The issue-
based opposition is not challenging the ANC’s power in government, but they are 
showing a growing dissatisfaction with government delivery in the population.  
 
The great inequality in South Africa is a major problem for the ANC government.  The 
poor people are becoming impatient to see a change in the economic structures. A 
democratic government needs to do something about such great inequalities to stay 
legitimate. The people of South Africa are loyal to the ANC, and this preserves their 
legitimate authority. Still a growing dissatisfaction tells of a possible legitimacy deficit 
if the ANC government does not allow for this criticism and listen to the demands for 
change.  
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